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CHAPTER 1: PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 1996, the two-year-long, half-billion-dollar campaign for president of the United 
States ended with the lowest voter turnout of any presidential election since 1924. 1 Fewer 
than 50 percent of adults old enough to cast a vote for their nation's highest office bothered to 
do so, according to reports from the Federal Election Commission. That same year, 
Americans' faith in their ability to influence the political process reached one of its lowest 
points in history. 2 According to National Election Studies data, the aggregate score on the 
survey's political efficacy index in 1996 was at its the third-lowest point in the survey's 
history; the two lowest points occurred in 1994 and 1990.3 
Data from the University of Michigan's National Election Studies, conducted every 
presidential and midterm election year since 1948, show that feelings of political 
empowerment - also called efficacy - have declined over the last two decades while 
cynicism toward politics has increased. In 1996, 62 percent of those surveyed agreed with the 
statement, "Public officials don't care what people like me think," compared with 51 percent 
in 1976 and 26 percent in 1956 (shown below in Figure 1). 
1 CBS News [transcript]. "Campaign costs, spending to exceed $600 million for the 1996 presidential 
campaign." Nov. 3, 1996. 
2 Braima, M.A.M., Johnson, T.J. and Sothirajah, J. "An efficacy model of electoral campaigns: The 1996 
presidential election." (1999.) Paper presented to the Communication Theory and Methods Division of the 
AEJMC convention. 
3 Sapiro, Virginia, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies. 1948-1998 Cumulative Data File 
[dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor], 1999. 
These materials are based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Nos. : SBR-
9707741, SBR-9317631, SES-9209410, SES-9009379, SES-8808361, SES-8341310, SES-8207580, and 
S0C77-08885. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in these materials are 
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Figure 1. Percent disagreeing with the statement, "I don't think public officials care 
much what people like me think." 
In 1994, a full 76 percent of those interviewed said they thought the government was 
run "by a few big interests looking out for themselves" rather than for the benefit of all 
people, compared with 66 percent in 1974 and 29 percent in 1964 (shown below in Figure 2). 
The numbers show that the largest leap in cynicism and drop in efficacy occurred 
during the 1960s and 1970s, periods of political unrest and disenchantment with authorities 
in light of civil-rights struggles, the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal. Despite a slight 
rebound in 1984, the data show that American voters' faith in elected officials never 
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Figure 2. Percent responding "a few big interests" to the statement, "Would you say 
the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it 
is run for the benefit of all the people?'' 
efficacy and participation continued to fall, until less than half the voting population helped 
pick a president in 1996. Americans, it seems, were more turned off than ever by politics. 
Political efficacy was a concept first developed to explain why some people voted 
and some didn't, and it has been considered a necessary norm for democracy because of its 
underlying belief that the political process is accessible to all who want their voice to be 
heard. 4 Research has shown that the extent to which citizens feel government will respond to 
their expressed needs affects the_ effort they are willing to exert in order to participate in the 
4 See, for example, Campbell, A., Gurin, G. and Miller, W.E. (1954.) The Voter Decides. Row, Peterson and 
Co.: New York; and Verba, S. and Nie, N.H. (1972.) Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social 
Equality. Harper and Row: New York. 
4 
political process.5 And, clearly, the more people who participate in the process, the more 
representative a government of the people will be. 
In research that has been evolving since the early 1970s, scholars have tried to 
explain the rising helplessness felt among American voters by implicating higher levels of 
cynicism and changes in the way the media cover politics. Researchers have found 
differences in the effects television and newspapers have on their audiences. Newspapers are 
thought to provide coverage that is more in-depth and more thoughtful, and they tend to be 
associated with higher feelings of empowerment and lower cynicism toward in the political 
system. Television, on the other hand, is said to provide political coverage that is less 
substantive and more affective - relying on projection of personal traits to evoke emotion. 6 
The emergence of television as voters' most prominent source of political information 
during and after the 1960s coincided with the rise in cynicism and other negative feelings 
toward government, leading researchers to conclude that the abbreviated, image-dependent 
coverage required by this new medium had led to the attitudinal changes. 7 In addition, the 
rise in political talk shows has subjected Americans to more analysis from commentators 
who attribute officials' every move to political strategy and punctuate every political story 
5 Pinkleton, B.E., Austin, E.W. and Fortman, K.K.J. (1998.) "Relationships of media use and political 
disaffection to political efficacy and voting behavior." Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 42, 1:34-
49; Finkel, S.E. ( 1985.) "Reciprocal effects of participation and political efficacy: A panel analysis." American 
Journal of Political Science, 29, 4:891-913; Braima et al. (1999) (ibid) 
6 For a thorough summary of the literature, see Miller, M.M. and Reese, S.D. (1982.) "Media dependency as 
interaction: Effects of exposure and reliance on political activity and efficacy." Communication Research, 9, 
2:227-238. 
7 Robinson, M.J. (1976.) '"Public affairs television and the growth of political malaise: The case of 'The Selling 
of the Pentagon."' American Political Science Review, 70:409-432; Keeter, S. (1987.) "The illusion ofintimacy: 
Television and the role of candidate personal qualities in voter choice." Public Opinion Quarterly, 51. 
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with opinion polls. This "horse-race" form of coverage, scholars and analysts believe, has 
caused Americans to become more cynical and less efficacious. 8 
Miller, Goldenberg and Erbring showed cynicism and efficacy to be separate 
components of a more general sense of political alienation, or disenchantment with and 
disconnection from the political processes that govern our society.9 Cynicism serves as a 
measure of trust in elected officials and beliefs about the purity of their motives, and it is 
considered a diffuse political orientation - a broad, underlying attitude toward the political 
system that affects more specific orientations like campaign interest and discussion. I 0 
Efficacy relates to the public's perception of its ability to influence the political process 
through voting and activism, and it has been considered a diffuse orientation in the past but 
has become volatile and has acted more like a specific political orientation in recent years. I I 
Efficacy's erratic behavior reflects its complexity. For example, Balch demonstrated that it is 
necessary to distinguish between internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy indicates 
how well a citizen thinks he or she responds to the system; external efficacy indicates how 
well a citizen thinks the system responds to him or her. I2 
Political scientists have sought to understand political efficacy through its association 
with cynicism, but they have failed to achieve consistent empirical results. Rodgers noted· 
8 Cappella, J.N. and Jamieson, K.H. (1997.) The Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good Oxford 
University Press: New York. Also see Fallows, J. (1997.) Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine 
Democracy. Vintage Books: New York. 
9 Miller, A.H., Goldenberg, E.N. and Erbring, L. (1979.) "Type-set politics: Impact ofnewspapers on public 
confidence." The American Political Science Review, 73, 1:67-84. 
10 Miller, A.H. (1974.) "Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970." The American Political Science 
Review, 68, 3 :951-972. 
11 Smith, K.A. (1999.) "A reassessment of the relationship between public-affairs media use and political 
orientations." Paper presented to the Mass Communication and Society Division of the AEJMC, Aug. 4-7, 
1999. 
12 Balch, G.I. (1974) "Multiple indicators in survey research: The concept 'sense of political efficacy."' 
Political Methodology, 1, 2:1-43. 
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that psychologists have found that feelings of cynicism precede feelings of inefficacy but 
most of the political survey research that has been conducted has made use of cross-sectional 
samples and thus has not established a time-order causal direction between cynicism and 
inefficacy. 13 
Furthermore, two convincing but opposing arguments can be made about the effect of 
cynicism on efficacy. One theory is that cynicism will be positively related to efficacy by 
uniting dissatisfied people with others who share their beliefs. 14 Another theory holds that 
cynicism will be negatively related to efficacy because if voters believe the government is 
beholden to special interests or otherwise is corrupt and manipulative, they are not likely to 
be optimistic about their ability to influence the political process. 15 
Communication researchers, for their part, have tried to establish the differing roles of 
newspapers and television in political attitude formation by studying direct correlations 
between various measures of media use and efficacy. Again, the empirical results have been 
inconsistent, perhaps because most research has not considered a mediating variable, such as 
cynicism. Miller, Goldenberg and Erbring tested such a model, finding that media use was 
positively related to cynicism and that cynicism was positively related to external efficacy. 16 
Pinkleton, Austin and Fortman also tested indirect relationships between media use and the 
13 Rodgers, Jr., H.R. (1974.) "Toward explanation of the political efficacy and political cynicism of black 
adolescents: An exploratory study." American Journal of Political Science, 18, 2:257-282. 
14 Litt, E. (1963.) "Political cynicism and political futility." The Journal of Politics, 25, 2:312-323; Austin, E.W. 
and Pinkleton, B.E. (1995.) ''Positive and negative effects of political disaffection on the less experienced 
voter." Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 39, 2:215-235. 
15 Agger, RE., Goldstein, M.N. and Pearl, S.A. (1961.) "Political cynicism: Measurement and meaning." The 
Journal of Politics, 23, 3:477; Rodgers (ibid) 
16 Miller, A.H., Goldenberg, E.N. and Erbring, L. (1979.) "Type-set politics: Impact of newspapers on public 
confidence." The American Political Science Review, 73, 1 :67-84. 
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various components of political disaffection, finding that cynicism was negatively related to 
efficacy. 17 
Another problem with media effects research, as Shoemaker and Reese have noted, is 
that it has done a poor job of integrating attributes of media content into studies about 
attitude formation. 18 To demonstrate that television use is correlated with increased cynicism 
and then assert that television causes cynicism through coverage that is driven by personal 
traits makes a logical leap. In order to make the connection between media coverage of 
politics and increased cynicism toward the political system, a researcher must study what 
voters are learning from the media and then whether those lessons are leading them to 
become more cynical. To do this, one must include a cognitive element in the model - a 
component that has been sorely missing in the literature linking media use and political 
attitudes. 
Using panel and cross-sectional data from 1992 and 1996 surveys conducted by the 
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, this thesis proposes to synthesize 
political science and communication models of political efficacy in order to test time-order 
relationships. The results should go a long way toward reconciling the many findings 
regarding media use and political efficacy, as well as illuminate some causes and 
consequences of rising political cynicism among the American electorate. 
17 Pinkleton et al. did not distinguish between internal and external efficacy. See Austin (ibid); Pinkleton, B.E., 
Austin, E.W. and Fortman, K.K.J. (1998.) "Relationships of media use and political disaffection to political 
efficacy and voting behavior." Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 42, 1 :34-49. 
18 Shoemaker, P.J. and Reese, S.D. (1990.) "Exposure to what? Integrating media content and effects studies." 
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 67, 4:649-652. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Political scientists and researchers have devoted much thought and study to the rising 
tendency of Americans not to participate or show interest in politics, giving name to many 
feelings that might be driving the trend: apathy, powerlessness, cynicism, futility, 
(in)e:fficacy, competence, malaise, negativity and (non)support for government, to cite a few 
of the most commonly used terms. 
There has been no defining work telling the novice researcher how to navigate among 
these terms, but they all represent concern on the part of researchers and others about a sense 
felt by some members ofU.S. society that they are not part of the democratic process-
whether they dismiss the system, finding it not worthy of the~ participation, or feel the 
system dismisses them, because of characteristics belonging either to them or to the system. 
This general feeling of detachment from the political process has been called political 
alienation, and the various feelings that cause alienation, or detachment, can be considered 
specific dimensions of a larger, more nebulous political phenomenon. This thesis addresses 
two of these dimensions: political cynicism, a lack of trust in government, and political 
efficacy, a perception that one is able to influence the political process. 
Political Efficacy 
The concept of political efficacy was first introduced by Campbell, Gurin and Miller 
in The American Voter and The Voter Decides, landmark studies of the 1948 and 1952 
9 
elections that are still influencing analyses ofNational Election Studies data 50 years later. 
One objective of the authors was to examine "the nature and correlates of political 
participation"19, and they measured survey respondents' sense of political efficacy as a likely 
harbinger of participation, be it through voting or other means. 
"Sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual political 
action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worth while 
to perform one's civic duties. "2° Campbell et al. originally proposed five agree-disagree 
items on the questionnaire to measure political efficacy: 
1. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think. 
2. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in 
this country. 
3. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the 
government runs things. 
4. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 
5. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person 
like me can't really understand what's going on. 
The second item was eventually dropped because it demonstrated a large percentage of error, 
and scores on the remaining four items were used as a political efficacy index. 
Items 1 and 4 might appear very similar at first glance, but they were intended to tap 
different components of efficacy. Upon closer examination, we find that the first statement 
places the responsibility of action with public officials by asking to what extent the subject 
19 Campbell, A., Gurin, G. and Miller, W.E. (1954.) The Voter Decides. Row, Peterson and Co.: New York. p. 
2. 
2° Campbell et al. p. 187. 
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feels officials are responsive to people like him or her. Item 4, on the other hand, places the 
burden of action with the subject by questioning how much control he or she has over what 
government does. The difference between those two items represents a cleft in researchers' 
understanding of political efficacy, which will be discussed later. 
Item 3 was intended to measure respondents' understanding of all the options for 
political participation available to him or her. It operates under the assumption that not only 
does each citizen have the right to vote in this country, but there are also many other ways to 
attempt to influence the political process: writing letters to congressional representatives, 
volunteering to work on a candidate's campaign, participating in organized protests, trying to 
persuade one's acquaintances of one belief or another, organizing special-issue groups and 
donating money to political causes. Agreement to the statement indicated lower levels of 
efficacy because it meant the respondent felt constrained in the ways he or she could try to 
influence governmental decisions. This item was later questioned for being vague and was 
discarded by researchers. 21 
Finally, ·statement 5 measures respondents' perceptions of how capable they are in 
understanding the political process, the assumption being that in order to participate 
effectively in our form of democracy, people must be assured of their ability to comprehend 
the issues and process by which policy is made. Whether people perceive that process to be 
within mental reach is logically a component of whether they perceive it to be within reach at 
all. 
21 Acock, A., Clarke, H.D. and Stewart, M.C. (1985.) "A new model for old measures: A covariance structure 
analysis of political efficacy." The Journal of Politics, 47, 4:1062-1084. 
11 
Agreement with all four statements indicated a low feeling of political efficacy, 
which gave rise in later years to criticism from researchers who suspected an acquiescence 
bias in respondents' scores. Research has shown that some respondents demonstrate a 
tendency to agree more than disagree with survey items for a variety of reasons: they are in a 
hurry, they feel intimidated or they react falsely to suggestions of attitudes they hadn't 
considered before.22 In the case of the political efficacy scale, however, Wright found any 
acquiescence bias to be insignificant. 
Items 1, 4 and 5 went on to become the most consistently used measures of political 
efficacy, despite objections from researchers who found them lacking in validity and 
reliability.23 The NES three-item political efficacy scale is one of the most enduring of the 
surveys' indices over the past 50 years. 
Campbell et al. found support for their theory that feelings of political efficacy would 
be positively associated with respondents' reports of having voted and/or having worked on a 
political campaign.24 In 1952, 42 percent of those who were high in participation were also 
high in efficacy; only 12 percent of those high in participation were low in efficacy. 
Conversely, 13 percent of those who were low in participation were high in efficacy; 47 
percent of those who were low in participation were also low in efficacy. The results held for 
each of the demographic controls that were imposed later, of which the authors reported that 
education appeared to be particularly important. The college-educated reported feeling much 
22 Wright, J.D. (1975.) "Does acquiescence bias the index of political efficacy?" Public Opinion Quarterly, 39, 
2:219-226. 
23 Craig, S.C., Niemi, R.G. and Silver, G.E. (1990.) "Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES pilot 
study items.'' Political Behavior, 12, 3:289-314; Niemi, R.G., Craig, S.C. and Mattei, F. (1991.) ~'Measuring 
internal political efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study." American Political Science Review, 85, 4:1401-
1413. 
24 Campbell et al. 
12 
more efficacious than those who did not have a college education. In addition, men felt more 
efficacious than women, and whites felt more efficacious than blacks. Geographically, the 
South scored lower on the efficacy scale than the rest of the country, and rural areas scored 
lower than urban areas. Age, income and type of occupation also influenced feelings of 
efficacy, with respondents who were older, who reported higher incomes and who held 
professionaljobs obtaining higher efficacy scores than those who were younger, who 
reported lower incomes and who held blue-co 11ar jobs. 
Campbell and his colleagues concluded their 1952 remarks about efficacy by noting 
that although the main effect between political efficacy and political participation was 
demonstrated for all control variables, the positive effect that feelings of efficacy had on 
participation appeared to be enhanced among those of a lower socioeconomic status (SES) -
ensuring the concept of efficacy an important role in future conversations about how to 
encourage participation in the political system. 
Verba and Nie proposed an inverted model of political participation, arguing that SES 
first leads to the development of civic attitudes such as efficacy, which then leads to 
participation.25 In their modei efficacy plays the mediating role instead of SES, as Campbell 
et al. had suggested. Rodgers disputed Verba and Nie's theory when, trying to explain lower 
levels of efficacy and higher levels of cynicism among blacks, he found no evidence for 
social-deprivation models giving SES a causal role in levels of political efficacy.26 It appears 
necessary, therefore, to implement demographic controls in any model of efficacy but not to 
attribute any main effect to them. 
25 Verba, S. and Nie, N.H. (1972.) Participation i,:z America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. Harper 
and Row: New York. 
26 Rodgers. 
13 
In addition to predicting participation, political efficacy has also been used as a 
measure of difluse support for the political system. Easton and Dennis were among the first 
to study efficacy this way, noting that it was generally assumed to be an important norm for 
democracy27 and partly defining it as "a disposition towards politics, a feeling of 
effectiveness and capacity in the political sphere."28 
American schoolchildren have been taught for centuries that the American form of 
government is superior to others because of its inclusiveness and its idea of one vote per 
person. In this tradition, Easton and Dennis theorized that level of perceived political efficacy 
among Americans of all ages could be used to measure the well-being of our democratic 
institution and predict citizens' diffuse support for government.29 
Studying children's political socialization, Easton and Dennis described political 
efficacy as an amalgam of three things: a norm, a psychological disposition or feeling, and a 
form of behavior. They defined it this way: "The psychological counterpart to the basic 
regime rule, involving as it will the mutual expectations of the participating member and the 
responsive authorities, is therefore a firm conviction by the individual that he is in fact 
politically effective."30 They used Campbell's five items and added three others to form an 
efficacy index. 
Easton and Dennis found it important to note the difference between a norm and an 
attitude because they thought the children they studied would not be able to make the 
distinction between how our government is supposed to operate and how it actually does 
27 Balch. 
28 Easton, D. and Dennis, J. (1967). "The child's acquisition ofregime norms: Political efficacy." The American 
Political Science Review, 61, 1:25-38. 
29 Easton, D. and Dennis, J. 
30 Easton, D. and Dennis, J. p. 26. 
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operate. Nevertheless, the authors found that children had begun developing feelings of 
political efficacy by the third grade, lending support to their conception of efficacy as a 
diffuse orientation toward government that is learned while growing up and persists into 
adulthood. 
The concept has been dissected since then, and its measurement has been debated. 
Balch demonstrated it was necessary to distinguish between internal and external efficacy -
internal·efficacy (sometimes called subjective efficacy) being the extent to which a person 
thinks he or she is able to navigate and influence the political process, external efficacy ( or 
objective efficacy) being the extent to which a person thinks elected officials listen to the 
people who voted them into office. 31 Put another way, internal efficacy indicates how well a 
citizen thinks he or she responds to the system; external efficacy indicates how well a citizen 
thinks the system responds to him or her. 
In the NES three-item efficacy index, the following two items were found to measure 
internal efficacy: 
1. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 
2. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person 
like me can't really understand what's going on. 
And this third item was found to measure external efficacy: 
3. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think. 
A covariance structure analysis by Acock, Clarke and Stewart indicated that it was 
proper to distinguish between internal and external efficacy, and that the first two NES items 
31 Balch. 
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do, in fact, measure a concept that might be called internal efficacy. 32 However, they argued 
that the third item is theoretically ambiguous and found empirical evidence that it could be 
loaded as a measure of internal or external efficacy. They also concluded that the first two 
items should not be weighted equally; the first item was a stronger predictor of efficacy than 
the second. 
Effects regarding internal and external efficacy sometimes diverge, whether they are 
being tested as dependent or independent variables. For example, Braima found that exposure 
to political advertisements was negatively associated with external efficacy but unrelated to 
internal efficacy.33 And Finkel found that external efficacy has a circular effect with political 
participation, each influencing the other, but that internal efficacy's effect on voting was 
simply a unidirectional relationship; voting had no reciprocal effect on internal efficacy. 34 
Balch found that those who exhibited high external efficacy - who perceived the 
system responded effectively to their needs - were less likely to protest, less informed and 
more trustful of government. In direct contrast, those who exhibited high internal efficacy -
who perceived themselves as able to understand and influence the political system - were 
more likely to protest, more informed and less trustful of government. 
Acock et al. noted that internal efficacy and external efficacy have been studied too 
often as one concept, arguing that empirical evidence clearly shows them to be separate 
concepts.35 However, a preliminary reliability test of the data used in this study indicated the 
three items should be analyzed as a single concept. The results of that analysis are presented 
in the methods chapter. 
32 Acock et al. 
33 Braima et al. 
34 Finkel. 
35 Acock et al. 
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Two avenues of thought have prevailed in the discussion of political efficacy, raising 
this question: Were early researchers right in assuming that efficacy could be considered a 
measure of citizens' diffuse support for government?36 
Studying SRC panel data from 1972-1976 and controlling for education and personal 
competence, Iyengar regressed external efficacy on incumbent approval, policy satisfaction, 
interparty competition and voting success. He found that external efficacy was not related to 
feelings toward the incumbent, was moderately related to level of policy approval and was 
stable over time. Likewise, Asher concluded from 1956-1968 SRC data that "minor 
differences that do exist in no way support the notion that supporters of the victor become 
more efficacious and partisans of the losers less so."37 
However, there is reason to believe the nature of political efficacy might be changing. 
Smith noted that political efficacy, like other diffuse orientations, has begun to act more like 
a specific orientation by varying considerably in recent years. 38 It has declined overall since 
the 1950s; but beginning in the 1980s, National Election Studies data have shown it to be 
higher during presidential election years than during off-year elections. The spikes in 
efficacy might indicate that it has become sensitive to the short-term political environment. 
Smith noted that media use can be considered a measure of exposure to short-term political 
forces, but using 1990-1992 NES panel data and the three most-often used efficacy items 
from those surveys, he found that media use was not related to.political efficacy. Instead, he 
found the strongest predictors of 1992 levels of efficacy to be 1990 levels of campaign 
36 Iyengar, S. (1980.) "Subjective political efficacy as a measure of diffuse support." Public Opinion Quarterly, 
44, 2:249-256. 
37 Asher H. (1974.) ''The reliability of the political efficacy items." Political Methodology, 1, 2:52. 
38 Smith, K.A. (1999.) ''A reassessment of the relationship between public-affairs media use and political 
orientations." Paper presented to the Mass Communication and Society Division of the AEJMC, Aug. 4-7, 
1999. 
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interest, political discussion and attention - orientations that were influenced by media use in 
1992. 
How, then, do we explain efficacy's behavior as a specific orientation but its seeming 
imperviousness to the media? One possibility congruent with Smith's results is a multi-step 
model in which the mass media affect other political orientations, which in turn affect 
political efficacy. In other words, maybe tests of a direct relationship between media use and 
efficacy have missed a step that would indicate a sort of two-step flow at work. 
Miller et al. tested such a model.39 Using 1974 NES survey data and a corresponding 
content analysis of the newspapers used by respondents, the researchers discovered that 
critical newspaper coverage of government had a positive relationship with cynicism, which 
in turn showed a negative relationship with efficacy. The indirect model of efficacy was a 
much better fit than a model showing a slight negative relationship between critical content 
and efficacy. "Only through its influence on a general political distrust of authorities does the 
media have an indirect influence on evaluations of institutional responsiveness," the authors 
wrote.40 
This chapter will now turn to a discussion of political cynicism as one mediating 
variable between measures of media use and feelings of efficacy. 
Political Cynicism 
Cynicism has been considered as detrimental to democracy as efficacy has been 
considered vital to it, and it increased dramatically in the last half of the 20th century - most 
39 Miller et al. 
40 Miller et al. p. 82. 
18 
notably after the Watergate scandal of the 1970s that led to the resignation of President 
Richard Nixon. 
Agger, Goldstein and Peari in their pioneering work on cynicis~ defined cynicism 
as ''the extent to which people hold politicians in disrepute, the extent to which these words 
symbolize something negative rather than something positive." 41 
The researchers found no differences in cynicism among Democrats, Republicans and 
independents, suggesting that cynicism is a more general sentiment towards government and 
not contingent upon evaluation of the party in power. They also found that those who were 
more educated were less cynical and those who were older were more cynical. They found no 
relationship between income and cynicism but a positive relationship between personal 
cynicism and political cynicism. 
As the concept of cynicism was explored further, researchers came to define it as the 
opposite of trust. Miller et al. said cynicism "reflects the belief that the government is not 
functioning in accordance with individual expectations of efficiency, honesty, competence 
and equity.',42 Cappella and Jamieson suggested that cynicism is the extent to which 
constituents do not trust elected officials to do the right thing most of the time, do not trust 
that they operate with their constituents' interests at heart, do not trust that they are honest 
and do not trust that they function within the law. 43 
It must be acknowledged that cynicism as a general concept embodies additional 
aspects of negativity: a belief that all people are motivated by selfishness or, failing that, 
scorn for any values or motives people cite as reasons for their behavior and mockery of 
41 Agger, R.E., Goldstein, M.N. and Pearl, S.A. (1961.) "Political cynicism: Measurement and meaning." The 
Journal of Politics, 23, 3, p. 477. 
42 Miller et al. p. 67. 
43 Cappella, J.N. and Jamieson, K.H. (1997.) The Spiral a/Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good 
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anything bearing resemblance to convention. Upon examining such an attitude on a 
psychological leveL however, one might conclude that it reveals defensiveness- a veneer or 
even a deeply held disposition that is designed to deflect injury to one's ego. Fear of being 
hurt or let down provides people a convenient reason not to trust, thus returning any 
discussion of cynicism to its original operationalization as the opposite of trust. 
Taking a more practical perspective, Fraser took issue with researchers' treatment of 
cynicism as the opposite of trust but followed suit for the sake of consistency within the field. 
He noted: "The terms 'political mistrust' and 'political cynicism' are not necessarily 
equivalent, though, in an effort to broaden the theoretical focus I am using them 
interchangeably. The point of this report is not to clarify terminological perplexities but to try 
to work toward explanation of variance in one apparently accepted operationalization of 
political mistrust, Agger's 'political cynicism. ,,,44 
The National Election Study items that are most often used to measure political 
cynicism compose the NES trust-in-government scale, which includes the following four 
items: 
1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in 
Washington to do what is right- just about always, most of the time, or only 
some of the time? 
2. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 
44 Fraser, J. (1971.) "Personal and political meaning correlates of political cynicism." Midwest Journal of 
Political Science, 15, 2:347-364, p.347. This study will take the same approach. 
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3. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in 
taxes, waste some of it or don't waste very much of it? 
4. Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are 
crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? 
The first item clearly taps Cappella and Jamieson' s assertion that political cynicism is 
a lack of trust in officials to do the right thing. Those who answer 'just about always" would 
be considered the least cynical; those who answer "most of the time" would be considered 
middle-of-the-road; and those who answer "some of the time" would be considered the most 
cynical. 
The second item is based on democratic assumptions that government ought to serve 
all people equally and that no one is above the law. Feeling that government serves a few 
special interests rather than working for the benefit of all people suggests a belief that our 
democratic government is not abiding by its norms. The item is grounded in the definitions of 
both Miller et al. and Cappella and Jamieson; Miller et al. included perceptions of inequity in 
their definition of cynicism, and Cappella and Jamieson said cynicism indicates a lack of 
trust in officials to operate in the best interests of their constituents. Therefore, those who 
respond that government is run ''for the benefit of all" would be considered less cynical than 
those who respond that government is run "by a few big interests." 
The third item, a "pocketbook" item, asks respondents whether they can trust 
government to spend their money in an appropriate way. The item is reflected in the 
definition of cynicism put forth by Miller et al., who said cynicism indicates a belief that 
public officials cannot be trusted to meet expectations of efficiency and competence. One 
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might argue that this item has an ideological undercurrent. Conservatives would probably be 
more likely to answer that government wastes "a lot of the money we pay in taxes" and 
therefore would be considered more cynical than liberals, who would be more likely to 
answer that government doesn't "waste very much of it" and therefore would be considered 
less cynical. In fact, the LISREL results reported by Niemi et al. show that this item loads the 
least strongly of all the items; however, as they conclude, the factor loading is not so low as 
to suggest the item be tossed out of the scale. 45 
The fourth item - "Do you think that quite a few of the people running the 
government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are 
crooked?" - tests respondents' perceptions of officials' honesty, included in the definitions of 
both Miller et al. and Cappella and Jamieson, as well as respondents' perceptions about the 
extent to which officials function within the law, also included in Cappella and Jamieson's 
definition. Answering "hardly any of them are" crooked would be considered the lowest level 
of cynicism, answering "not very many are" would be considered middle of the road and 
answering "quite a few" are crooked would be considered the highest level of cynicism. 
Niemi, Craig and Mattei conducted a factor analysis of the four trust in government 
items and found that all four loaded highly enough on a single factor to conclude the scale is 
unidimensional. The authors confirmed the results with a LISREL analysis. 46 
However, there has been some debate within the community as to whether the trust-
in-government scale reflects beliefs about specific politicians, usually incumbents, or 
whether it reflects beliefs about the political system overall. 
45 Niemi et al. 
46 Niemi et al. The LISREL estimates for each item, reported by the authors, are as follows: TRUST, . 72; 
BIGINT, .80; WASTETAX, .51; and CROOKED, .65. 
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Miller found a curvilinear relationship between cynicism and policy preferences 
among survey respondents in 1964-1970, with those holding centrist positions reporting less 
cynicism than those occupying extreme ends of policy continuums. His explanation for this 
result was that the government had been adopting centrist policies at the time - ironically, in 
an attempt to please the most people - so issues that were substantially polarized led to more 
cynicism because more people perceived their opinions to be more distant from the 
government's. Another situation that led to cynicism, Miller said, is when a voter's preferred 
party offered policy alternatives that were not satisfactory to him or her, and he or she did not 
perceive the other party as an option; this led to cynicism, he said, because there was 
effectively no viable option for representation - just like the voter who was independent of 
either party because neither reflected his or her issue stances. 
Miller concluded that short-term events such as policy formation can lead to an spike 
in cynicism, but he argued that such widespread and long-term cynicism as the United States 
was witnessing reflects negative affect toward the system as a whole: "While discontent that 
exists only for a short time and acts as a catalyst for needed change may reflect a functional 
political system, extended periods of widespread political malaise suggest that the normal 
means by which conflict is managed in the political system are not fully operative.',47 
Disputing Miller's findings, Citrin argued that cynicism does not necessarily indicate 
a lack of diffuse support for government, using data that showed a significant proportion of 
Americans to feel cynical toward their government but also proud of it. To further support his 
case, he analyzed data from the 1972 NES survey, showing a correlation between trust and 
approval of the incumbent president. "At a minimum ... the Trust in Government scale fails 
47 Miller (1974.) p.951. 
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to discriminate between the politically alienated and those who mistrust particular leaders or 
politicians as.a class without repudiating regime values or institutions," Citrin wrote.48 He 
also argued that cynicism was fashionable during the period of Miller's study, and that it may 
have been difficult to separate those who truly found the system to be unacceptable from 
those who thought it appealing to say they did. 
Erber and Lau reconciled Miller's and Citrin's competing claims about cynicism with 
an information-processing theory: 
The crux of the argument between Miller and Citrin lies in the interpretations 
of the standard CPS trust in government scale. It is unclear just ·how people 
interpret the trust in government items. Some respondents may interpret these 
items as meaning hostility toward ''the institutions of government" and ''the 
regime as a whole" and a "negative orientation toward the political system," 
as Miller holds, while other respondents may interpret them as meaning "mere 
disapproval of incumbent political leaders," a ''fashionable . . . ritualistic 
negativism rather than an enduring sense of estrangement" from our system of 
government, as Citrin argues. We think that people do vary in terms of how 
they interpret the trust in government items. However, we propose that part of 
this variation is systematic and can be accounted for by considering the ways 
people typically think about politics. 49 [Italics in original.] · · 
Erber and Lau' s theory was supported by their results, which were obtained from data 
gathered during the NES1972-74-76 panel study and during the NES 1984 cross-sectional 
survey. They found that respondents who had a person-oriented approach to politics became 
more cynical when they disapproved of the incumbent president's job performance, while 
respondents who took an issue-oriented approach to politics became more cynical when 
48 Citrin, J. (1974) "Comment: The political relevance of trust in government." The American Political Science 
Review, 68, 3:973-988, p. 976. 
49 Erber, R. and Lau, R.R. (1990.) "Political cynicism revisited: An information-processing reconciliation of 
policy-based and incumbency-based interpretations of changes in trust in government." American Journal of 
Political Science, 34, 1 :236-253. p. 237-238. 
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distance widened between their own issue stands and those of both the incumbent president 
and the challenger. 
The general notion underlying discussions of cynicism is that citizen support is 
fundamental to a democratic republic: Without the people's support, a government of the 
people cannot function. In a system that is not a true democracy, but a republic in which 
citizens do not directly make decisions allocating resources but elect the people to make 
those decisions on their behalf, cynicism toward those whom the voters have elected is 
devastating, political scientists and others have said.50 If the public - and the media, as some 
have argued - expect the worst of elected officials, honorable people may be hesitant to run 
for office, creating a self-fulfilling spiral of inadequacy and corruption.51 
However, in examining the relationship between cynicism and efficacy, some 
researchers have argued that cynicism does not necessarily have negative implications for 
democracy. Craig et al. reported that the general feeling among scholars is that negativism of 
the 1960s and 1970s did not represent a loss of diffuse support for the political system. 52 And 
some researchers have hypothesized that higher levels of cynicism are actually associated 
with higher feelings of efficacy by generating passion, instilling a sense of unity with others 
who are dissatisfied with the status quo and calling voters to action in order to change the 
system. "Social change advocates," as Miller termed them, tend to approve of 
antigovernment protest - a form of participation, albeit unsanctioned - and would not be 
50 Easton, D. (1965)A Systems Analysis of Political Life. John Wiley and Sons Inc.: New York. 
51 See, for example, Fallows, J. (1997) Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine Democracy. Vintage 
Books: New York; and Cappella and Jamieson. 
52 Craig, S.C., Niemi, RG. and Silver, G.E. (1990) "Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES Pilot 
Study Items." Political Behavior, 12, 3:289-314. 
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exerting so much effort if they did not hold the idealistic assumption that they can make a 
difference in the political realm. 
Either a positive or a negative association between cynicism and efficacy is 
theoretically intuitive, as initially noted by Agger et al.: 
Part of the political folklore has it that political cynicism is positively related 
to political potency, that is, that the most politically cynical tend to be high on 
political potency while the politically trusting tend to feel politically impotent. 
... An alternative view would have it that a sense of political impotency 
would go hand in hand with a cynical view of politics and politicians. 53 
A negative relationship between cynicism and efficacy is easily explained by the 
logic that if voters believe politicians to be manipulative and beholden to powerful interests 
that are not in line with their own, they are unlikely to feel influential. Miller offers an 
especially eloquent explanation of this thinking: 
A period of sustained discontent may result from deep-seated social conflict 
which, for some segment of the population, has been translated into a negative 
orientation toward the political system because their sense of insufficient 
political influence implies a futility in bringing about desired social change or 
control through political efforts; hence, they feel the government is generally 
not to be trusted because it does not function for them. 54 
However, Austin and Pinkleton hypothesized that a third-person effect would cause 
cynicism to be positively correlated with political efficacy among college students because 
those who considered themselves wise to the world of politics might think others were not so 
53 Agger et al. p. 493. 
54 Miller, A. (1974) "Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970." The American Political Science 
Review, 68, 3. p. 951. 
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clever and thus might enjoy an inflated sense of their own effectiveness. 55 Litt also predicted 
that cynicism would lead to greater efficacy through a sense of solidarity with others who are 
dissatisfied. 56 
The hypotheses of Austin and Pinkleton and Litt have not been supported. Pinkleton 
et al. found a substantial negative correlation between political cynicism and political 
efficacy, as did Agger et al. years earlier.57 Litt found no relationship at all between cynicism 
and efficacy in his study of Boston voters. Furthermore, in Rodgers' summary of literature, 
he noted that a time-ordered causal direction had been established by Erikson, who reported 
that cynicism was a precursor to feelings of inefficacy in children. 58 
The literature therefore indicates we should expect to see a negative relationship 
between cynicism and efficacy, with cynicism acting as the causal variable: The more cynical 
one is, the less efficacious he or she becomes. 
Hl: Political cynicism leads to lower feelings of political efficacy. 
Political Cynicism Lower Political Efficacy 
Figure 3. Model of hypothesis 1. 
55 Austin, E.W. and Pinkleton, B.E. (1995) "Positive and negative effects of political disaffection on the less 
experienced voter." Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 39, 2:215-235. 
56 Litt, E. (1963) "Political cynicism and political futility." The Journal of Politics, 25, 2:312-323. 
57 Pinkleton, B.E., Austin, E.W. and Fortman, K.K.J. (1998) "Relationships of media use and political 
disaffection to political efficacy and voting behavior." Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 42, I :34-
49; and Agger et al. 
58 Erikson, E. (1950) Childhood and Society. Norton and Co.: New York, in Rodgers. 
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Building the model backwards, the chapter will now turn to a discussion of how a 
multi-step model that includes measures of media use, cynicism and efficacy might look. 
There is much research suggesting a direct relationship between measures of media use and 
cynicism, but the empirical evidence is inconsistent and suggests there might be an indirect 
effect at work. Erber and Lau showed that people's information-processing strategies interact 
with their perceptions of current events to cause cynicism. One way we might test cognitions 
is by studying how people evaluate candidates for public office. 
Candidate Evaluations 
In Spiral of Cynicism, Cappella and Jamieson argued that "soundbite" news coverage 
of campaigns that has become more episodic, image-based and strategy-focused, rather than 
issue-oriented, is leading the public to become more cynical. The researchers showed to 
experimental groups professional news segments that were of different varieties: issue-
oriented and strategy-oriented.59 They reported that the groups shown the issue-oriented 
segment reported less cynicism after the showing than the group that watched the strategy-
oriented segment. Furthermore, they said subjects were cognizant of which kind of segment 
they had seen, responding correctly to forced-choice questions asking them about the nature 
of the segment. 
As Shoemaker and Reese have noted, media effects research generally has done a 
poor job of including media content - instead leaping from media exposure to changes in 
59 By "strategic" news coverage, the authors are referring to reporting that covers deal-making and other 
methods of passing legislation, political motives behind a candidate's or an official's position on an issue, and 
campaign strategy, among other things. By "issue" news coverage, the authors are referring to reporting that 
illustrates the problem and discusses the relative merits of alternative solutions. 
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attitudes and ignoring the cognitive element implicit in the model. 60 But in order to make the 
connection between media coverage of politics and increased cynicism toward the political 
system, a researcher must question whether cynicism is a reaction to media coverage -
something a simple measure of media exposure fails to prove- by first studying what voters 
are learning from the media and then whether those lessons are leading them to become more 
cynical. According to Miller et al.: 
[N]o analysis of the relationship between media exposure (or reliance) and 
political attitudes can really answer questions about media impact on political 
efficacy or trust, because such an analysis can only assume, without empirical 
evidence, that there is something about the media content to which people 
have been exposed that affects individual attitudes.61 
One way of examining what people have learned through their media use and 
attention to coverage of political campaigns is measuring what they have learned about 
candidates. 
Campbell et al. established that some voters were issue-oriented and some were 
candidate-oriented, though the types were not exclusive of each other. Issue-oriented voters 
were sensitive to differences in policy positions between the two major parties and expressed 
involvement when asked about specific issues relevant in 1952. Candidate-oriented voters 
were identified during the course of an interview by their spontaneous mention of personal 
characteristics like honesty, sincerity and leadership or their praise of candidates with such 
simple statements as: "I like him." Whether issue-oriented or candidate-oriented, those who 
were highly oriented in both categories were also likely to be relatively efficacious and. to 
60 Shoemaker, P.J. and Reese, S.D. (1990.) "Exposure to what? Integrating media content and effects studies." 
Journalism Quarterly, 67. 
61 Miller, A.H., Goldenberg, E. N. and Erbring, L. ( 1979.) "Type-set politics: Impact of newspapers on public 
confidence." The American Political Science Review, 73, I: p. 68. 
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participate frequently in politics. The authors found demographic differences in the 
proportion of issue-oriented and candidate-oriented voters. Most notably, they reported that 
voters from union families were likely to be issue-oriented while women voters were more 
likely to be candidate-oriented. 62 
Seeking to reconcile Miller's and Citrin's differing views on cynicism, Erber and Lau 
used the likes/dislikes measure ofNES surveys to determine whether respondents displayed 
"issue chronicity" or "person chronicity" in how they evaluated government.63 They found 
that what was contributing to people's cynicism was influenced partly by how they processed 
political information. If issues were more salient to them, cynicism seemed to depend on 
their closeness in policy views to those in power. If personal traits were more salient to them, 
their level of cynicism seemed to be tied to their job evaluation of those in power. 
Erber and Lau's system of identifying people's information processing strategies is 
founded in schema theory.64 Schema theory argues that people are inundated with so much 
incoming information that they have to adopt mental maps in order to process the 
information as efficiently as possible. These mental constructs, or schemata, are based on 
preconceptions of the world and affect the angle one gives each piece of information as it 
arrives and the decisions one makes based on that information. A person with an "issue 
chronicity" who cares deeply about the future of Social Security, for example, ·may tend to 
evaluate candidates mostly on the basis of what the candidate plans to do about Social 
62 Campbell, A., Gurin, G. and Miller, W.E. (1954.) The Voter Decides. Row, Peterson and Co.: New York. 
63 Erber, F. and Lau, R.R. (1990.) "Political cynicism revisited: An information-processing reconciliation of 
policy-based and incumbency-based interpretations of changes in trust in government." American Journal of 
Political Science, 34, 1 :236-253. 
64 For a thorough and understandable overview of Erber and Lau's method, see DeSart, J.A. (1995.) 
''Information processing and partisan neutrality: A reexamination of the party decline thesis." The Journal of 
Politics, 51, 3:776-795. 
30 
Security. One with a "person chronicity," on the other hand, may evaluate candidates on 
personal attributes like honesty or likability; he or she may watch a candidate speak about 
Social Security but come away from the event, thinking: "He seems like an honest person." 
To measure chronicity type using Erber and Lau' s method, survey respondents' 
answers to open-ended questions about what they like and dislike about candidates are coded 
according to four schema types: persons, issues, parties or groups. The responses are 
weighted in the order they are mentioned: What respondents say first is weighted more 
heavily than what they say second, and what they say second is weighted more heavily than 
what they say third. "The theoretical basis for this is that a person who tends to process their 
political information on the basis of some particular attribute of that information (i.e., issues, 
parties, etc.) will give responses in an order that reflects the relative accessibility of that 
schema type," DeSart wrote. 65 The weights of the responses for each type (issue, person, 
party or group) are then summed and divided by the total summed response weights of all 
types, in order to control for verbosity. The method results in a score from Oto 1 that 
measures the respondents' relative accessibility of each type. The types are not exclusive. It 
would be possible for a respondent to achieve an equal score for issue chronicity and person 
chronicity. What Erber and Lau' s system allows researchers to do is evaluate the relative 
accessibility of each cognitive scheme for each respondent. 
Erber and Lau discovered that "person chronics," those whose cynicism was 
predicted by their evaluation of incumbents, were greater in number among "issue chronics," 
those whose cynicism was predicted by the distance between their issue stances and those of 
officials. This seems logical. Personal qualities having to do with an incumbent' s 
65 DeSart. p. 781. 
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competence, efficiency, honesty and trustworthiness are the very perceptions that define 
cynicism. In contrast, researchers have found that issue-related evaluations of a candidate are 
la d . . ~ unre te to cymctsm among voters. 
Therefore, the literature suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2: Adopting an approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue-oriented 
will lead to higher political cynicism. 
In analyzing aggregate trends in chronicity scores, DeSart found little evidence for a 
"rise in candidate-centered politics" over the past 30 years. In charting respondents' average 
scores, in fact, he noted that in 1976, person chronicity was substantially higher than issue 
chronicity, but the trend reversed in 1980 and issue chronicity continued to outscore person 
chronicity through 1992. However, DeSart noted that "person and issue chronicity measures 
are much more sensitive to the context of specific elections than either the group or party 
chronicity measures. ,'67 Therefore, the extent to which voters use and pay attention to the 
media and thus are subjected to those short-term forces may affect the cognitive constructs 
they use to make voting decisions. The chapter will now turn to a discussion of media use 
and attention as antecedents of political cognitions. 
Person-Oriented Approach-. Higher Political Cynicism-. Lower Political Efficacy 
Figure 4. Model of hypotheses 1 and 2. 
66 Cappella and Jamieson. 
67 DeSart. p. 786. 
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Media Use and Attention 
The mass med~ particularly television, have been blamed for widespread cynicism 
toward government and low levels of efficacy. Television repeatedly has been criticized for 
presenting political news that is episodic rather than thematic, abbreviated rather than 
thorough, dependent on images rather than issues and rooted in conflict rather than 
substantive discussion. 68 In contrast, newspapers are thought to provide coverage that is more 
in-depth, issue-related, locally driven and thoughtfu4 and generally they are believed to 
contribute positively to the political process. 69 
Robinson acknowledged that his assertions of''videomalaise" lacked evidence testing 
the content of television journalism but argued a priori that television news is qualitatively 
different from news presented in the print media. He suggested six reasons that television 
leads to lower efficacy, higher cynicism and increased negativity: 1) the relatively large 
television news audience; 2) the high credibility granted television networks by the public; 3) 
the "interpretive character of television news coverage"; 4) the negative emphasis of 
television news; 5) the focus on conflict and violence in television news; and 6) the "anti-
institutional theme" in network news (p.426). 70 
Robinson wrote that television news is structurally different than print news because 
it is under different constraints. Producers must fit news into predetermined time slots, and 
68 See, for example, Robinson, M.J. (1976) "Public-affairs television and the growth of political malaise: The 
case of 'The Selling of the Pentagon.'" The American Political Science Review, 70, 2:409-432; and, for an 
overview of the literature, Newton, K. (1999) "Mass media effects: Mobilization or media malaise?" British 
Journal of Political Science, 29, 4:577-599. 
69 For example, Atkin, C. K., and W. Gantz (1978). "Television news and political socialization." Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 42, 183-198; Becker, L.B. and Whitney, D.C. (1980) "Effects of media dependencies: 
Audience assessment of government." Communication Research, 7, 1:95-120; Newton, K. (1990); and 
Robinson, M.J. (1976). 
70 Robinson. p. 426. 
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all viewers see the same segment at the same time (in contrast to newspapers, where readers 
can choose to read only stories that interest them). To hold viewers' attention, Robinson 
argued, television emphasizes interpretive news reports and presents events in such a way 
that they have a beginning, a middle portion and an end. It also portrays conflict more often 
than consensus, violence more often than peace-all in the name ofbeing interesting. 
(T)he important point is that the television news story is inherently 
interpretive because it is inherently thematic. And, given the special and the 
traditional exigencies of network television, the interpretive TV story is more 
likely to be negativistic, contentious, or anti-institutional ( or some 
combination of the three) than is the same "story" told in print. It is also more 
likely to be overdone (p.428). 
However, a content analysis by Graber (1976) contradicted Robinson's assertions 
about television news. Examining the presidential campaigns of 1968 and 1972, Graber 
analyzed campaign-related content in 20 newspapers around the country as well as in ABC, 
CBS and NBC newscasts for 30 days prior to the election. She identified seven candidate-
oriented themes and four issue-oriented themes, and she coded each theme once for every 
story that included it, regardless of repetition within the story. 
She found large similarities between newspapers and television and between overall 
media coverage in the two elections. The preponderance of emphasis was on personality 
characteristics of the candidates. In 1968, 77 percent of all presidential qualities mentioned in 
the press pertained to personality. In 1972, that figure had dropped to 62 percent, but it was 
only a proportional drop; the number of personality mentions actually increased. On 
television in 1972, 75 percent of personal qualities focused on personality.71 
71 Graber noted that data regarding personal qualities mentioned on television were not available for 1968; only 
data on issue mentions were available, due to a change in the way the Vanderbilt University television news 
archives recorded telecasts between 1968 and 1972. 
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Comparing the ratio of issue to personal qualities covered by the med~ Graber again 
found similarities between newspapers and television. The ratio of issues to qualities was 44 
to 56 percent in the press in 1968 and 36 to 64 percent in 1972. On television in 1972, the 
ratio was 3 7 to 63 percent. 
Where television and newspapers diverged in Graber's study was the range of issues 
they covered. Newspapers reported on a greater variety of issues in relation to the candidates, 
while also showing a greater difference between the way the candidates presented 
themselves, through direct quotations and staged events, and the way journalists presented 
them, in news reports and analyses. In contrast, television tended to focus on a narrower 
range of issues in both elections, while largely portraying the candidates the same way they 
were presenting themselves. Graber explained her :findings this way: 
The explanation for this discrepancy between press and television quotes 
appears to be that the press, with its greater flexibility of formats, can provide 
space both for the candidate's presidential image of himself and for other 
images for him. Television, with less available room for featuring a variety of 
images, fits quotes more rigorously into whatever stereotypic image the 
medium is developing for the candidate. Besides homogenizing the images of 
particular candidates, television, compared to the press, also uses far more 
uniform patterns of issue coverage for all the candidates. In 1968 and 1972, 
for example, the issue patterns featured in quotations by various candidates 
were nearly identical for all candidates in television newscasts while they 
differed substantially for various candidates in press reports (p.297). 
Keeter's summary of literature indicated that content analyses of newspapers and 
television have shown the two media portray candidates very similarly, focusing on most of 
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the same personal characteristics, and that voters' overall perceptions of the candidates do 
not depend on where they get their information. 72 
However, Wagner found that voters dependent on television for their political news 
had difficulty judging the candidates on the basis of issues. 73 Keeter reconciled these two 
findings by concluding that while voters' final analysis of a candidate may not differ 
according to their medium of choice, perhaps the pieces of information they use to reach 
those judgments differ: 
[W]hile voters may hold similar images of candidates regardless of how they 
obtain political information, the importance of candidate images - relative to · 
other information - may be greater for voters who depend on television. 
Despite similarities with other media, television by its nature provides a 
qualitatively different product. It provides the candidate as a person .... 
Television makes information about candidates' personal qualities cheaper to 
obtain than information about the issues. 74 
Keeter's results supported this argument, showing that candidate personal qualities 
had been more important for the television-dependent than for the newspaper-dependent in 
every presidential election from 1964-1980. That is, examining the open-ended responses 
from NES data regarding candidate evaluations showed that those who were dependent on 
television for their campaign information were more likely to name personal qualities than 
those who were dependent on newspapers. 
A question that must be raised regarding schema theory and measures of media use is: 
At what point do people develop their cognitive processing strategies? Could it be that 
"person chronics" gravitate toward television while "issue chronics" rely more on 
72 Keeter, S. (1987) ''The illusion of intimacy: Television and the role of candidate personal qualities in voter 
choice.'' Public Opinion Quarterly, 51, 3:344-458. 
73 Wagner, J. (1983) "Media do make a difference: The differential impact of mass media in the 1976 
presidential race." American Journal of Political Science, 27:407-430. 
74 Keeter. p.345. 
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newspapers? If that were the case, any supposed media effect on information processing 
would be spurious. Keeter addressed the issue by controlling for education, arguing that any 
measure of issue knowledge would show high collinearity with education. Not only did the 
results hold when Keeter controlled for education, but they actually showed that candidate 
personal qualities were more important for college-educated television viewers than for 
television viewers who did not have a college education. 
Another question that has plagued communication researchers is: What is the best 
measure of media use? Wagner said that "it is desirable to construct an effective media 
variable that discriminates among ( 1) the kind, (2) the quality, and (3) the quantity of media 
use."75 He divided respondents into three groups: those who said they were frequent readers 
of political news; those who said they viewed nightly news on television ''frequently" or 
"sometimes" but were not frequent readers; and those who said their exposure to political 
news was limited either in print or on television. The media variable used by Keeter was 
simpler and came in the form of respondents' answers to a question about which medium 
"got the most ( campaign) information from" or which medium they "rely on most for news 
about political and current events."76 
The discrepancy between the two researchers' operationalizations is indicative of a 
larger problem within communication research. McLeod and McDonald note that one reason 
for inconsistent results regarding media effects has been inconsistent measurements of media 
use. They argue that there are actually five "media orientations" that measure use: time spent, 
exposure to specific content, degree of reliance, level of attention and motivation for use. 
75 Wagner. p. 412. 
76 Keeter. p. 346. 
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They found that using a measure of simple exposure ( e.g., hours spent watching television or 
number of newspapers read per week) can lead to weak results and, therefore, it is preferable 
to include more than one of the orientations in any analysis. For example, they described the 
way adding an attention component can enhance a simple exposure measure: 
Simple exposure to television is made up largely of viewing of entertainment 
programs and only incidentally involves watching news and documentaries. 
Whatever its merits as an indicator of attention to televised political ads, 
televising of news may reflect a large chunk of vaguely motivated drop-in 
behavior that contributes little to the political process. Attention may be the 
ingredient necessary for the television medium to play an integrative and 
political motivating function. 77 
Drew and Weaver also have advocated measuring attention in addition to exposure. 78 
Brians and Wattenberg answered the challenge, combining exposure and attention into one 
variable in their study of media impact on issue knowledge. For each respondent, they 
multiplied frequency of use for each medium by attention paid to political coverage in that 
medium. 79 Thus, they catne up with an index of media use and attention for both television 
and newspapers with regard to political coverage, though by doing so they were not able to 
distinguish the independent effects of each measure. 
Based on literature regarding the differences between television and newspapers, and 
suggestions regarding the measurement of media use, the following hypothesis was formed: 
77 McLeod, J.M. and McDonald, D.G. (1985.) "Beyond simple exposure: Media orientations and their impact 
on political processes." Communication Research, 12, l :3-33, p. 26-27. 
78 Drew, D. and Weaver, D. (1990.) "Media attention, media exposure, and media effects." Journalism 
Quarterly, 61, 4:740-748. . 
79 Brians, C.L. and Wattenberg, M.P. (1996.) "Campaign issue knowledge and salience: Comparing reception 
from TV commercials, TV news, and newspapers." American Journal of Political Science, 40, I: 172-193. 
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H3: Using and paying attention to television more than newspapers will nurture an 
approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue-oriented. 
Overview of Hypotheses 
By beginning with hypothesis 3 and synthesizing the predictions backwards toward 
hypothesis 1, the reader can examine chronologically the time-ordered model of political 
efficacy that is illustrated in Figure 5 below. Based on Keeter's finding that candidate 
personal qualities had been more important for the television-dependent than for the 
newspaper-dependent in every presidential election from 1964-1980, this model predicts that 
relative exposure and attention to television over newspapers for campaign coverage will 
lead viewers to develop likes and dislikes of candidates that are based more on personal traits 
than on issues. Then, because Erber and Lau discovered that "person chronics" - those whose 
cynicism was predicted by their evaluation of incumbents-were greater in number than 
"issue chronics," -the model predicts that a tendency to develop likes and dislikes of 
candidates that are based more on personal traits than on issues will result in higher feelings 
of cynicism. Finally, because Pinkleton et al. found a substantial negative correlation 
between political cynicism and political efficacy, as did Agger et al., the model predicts that 
feelings of higher political cynicism will lead to lower feelings of political efficacy. 
Television Use 










CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS 
This study uses ordinary least-squares regression to analyze cross-sectional data and a 
subset of panel data obtained from surveys conducted during the 1992 and 1996 U.S. 
presidential campaigns. To analyze cross-sectional data, the regression equations are set up to 
follow procedures used for path analysis; to analyze panel data, the regression equations are 
set up to follow procedures used to find cross-lagged correlations. 80 
Description of Data 
This study used data that were collected as part of the National Election Studies 
presidential-year surveys in 1992 and 1996. The American National Election Studies are 
conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan during presidential and midterm election years. The 1992 National 
Election Study consisted of a pre-election interview and a post-election re-interview, as did 
the 1996 National Election Study. The data are available online from the University of 
Michigan as part of the 1992-1997 data file. 81 Included in this file are responses from 1,005 
people who responded to the 1992 pre- and post-election surveys and 1,534 people who 
80 For an overview of path analysis and partial correlations, see Kerlinger, F.N. and Pedhazur, E.J. (1973.) 
Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.: New York. 
81 Sapiro, Virginia, Steven J. Rosenstone, Donald R Kinder, Warren E. Miller, and the National Election 
Studies. NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES, 1992-1997 COMBINED FILE [dataset]. 1st release. Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor], 1998. These materials are 
based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Nos.: SBR- 9707741, SBR-9317631, 
SES-9209410, SES-9009379, SES-8808361, SES-8341310, SES-8207580, and SOC77-08885. Any opinions, 
findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in these materials are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the National Science Foundation. 
40 
responded to the 1996 pre- and post-election surveys.82 Of those, 545 individuals served as a 
panel, answering all four 1992 and 1996 surveys along with one midterm survey taken in 
1994.83 
NES samples are drawn from the Survey Research Center's national sampling frame, 
which comes from the sample universe of U.S. households in all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. The national samples are multi-stageprobability designs. In three stages, 
geographical sampling units of decreasing size are randomly selected with probability 
proportionate to their total number of households. 
Before the first stage, primary areas are stratified within each of the four U.S. Census 
regions by geography and size, and then one primary sampling unit is selected from each 
stratum in a controlled selection process. Before the second stage, units are stratified again by 
geography, size and- in 36 of the 84 primary areas- by median per-capita income. Between 
six and 25 sampling segments are then selected from each area. At the third stage, a subset of 
households within each segment is randomly selected and a random-number table is used to 
select which member of the household will be contacted. 
All NES presidential-year interviews are conducted face to face in the respondents' 
homes. The SRC reports that since the mid-1970s, about seven out of 10 people in the NES 
samples have been interviewed; about two out of 10 refuse; and the rest are not interviewed 
because they are inaccessible. Regarding the pre- and post-election studies, between 85 
82 The disparity between the numbers of cross-sectional 1992 cases and cross-sectional 1996 cases is 
unfortunate. However, the NES 1992-97 file that was used for this research does not include respondents who 
were part of an earlier 1990-1992 panel study; to obtain those cases, the cumulative NES 1948-1998 data file 
must be used. Everyone who responded to all four 1992 and 1996 surveys was included; the only respondents 
not included were those who took part in 1990. 
83 Data from 1994 are not included as part of this study for two reasons: The item used to measure media 
attention was not included in the 1994 study, as it was in 1992 and 1996, and the open-ended questions 
measuring candidate evaluations pertained to congressional candidates rather than presidential candidates, 
which would have made comparisons with 1992 and 1996 difficult. 
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percent and 90 percent of those interviewed before the election are successfully re-
interviewed afterwards. 
Political Efficacy 
Political efficacy, or the feeling that one has the ability to influence the political 
system, was measured at Time 1 and Time 2, using the 1992 and 1996 post-election surveys, 
respectively. In keeping with the index that was initially proposed by Campbell et al. and has 
been used :frequently since then, 84 efficacy was measured by respondents' answers to the 
following three items: 
''Now I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell us when we interview 
them and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time and 
you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree 
somewhat or disagree strongly." 
1. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 
2. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think. 
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person 
like me can't really understand what's going on. 
In both 1992 and 1996, responses were coded on a continuous scale from 1-5, with 1 
indicating the respondent "strongly agrees" with the statement, 2 indicating the respondent 
"agrees somewhat" with the statement, 3 indicating the respondent "neither agrees nor 
disagrees," 4 indicating the respondent "disagrees somewhat" with the statement and 5 
indicating the respondent "strongly disagrees" with the statement. 
84 Campbell et al.; Balch; and Acock et al. 
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An additive index ranging from 3 to 15 was thus create~ with relatively low scores 
indicating low feelings of political efficacy and relatively high scores indicating high feelings 
of political efficacy. 
Previous literature had strongly suggested there would be a distinction between 
internal and external efficacy, with items 1 and 3 measuring internal efficacy and item 2 
measuring external efficacy.85 However, the 1992-1996 data set used for this study did not 
reflect such a distinction. A reliability analysis for the 1992 three-item efficacy index 
produced a Cronbach's alpha of .6228, with item 3 showing less reliability than the other two 
items. If item 3 is deleted, alpha increases to .6790, but if either item 1 or item 2 is deleted, 
the scale's overall reliability decreases to .4148 and .4376, respectively. Furthermore, the two 
items that were supposed to jointly measure internal efficacy, NOSAY and COMPLEX, were 
not sufficiently correlated to warrant such an operationalization. The inter-item correlations 
can be found in Table 1 below. 
As can be seen in the table, the two items that are the most highly correlated are 
NOSA Y and NOCARE, which researchers have posited measure two different concepts of 
efficacy. This result held for the 1996 data. 
Looking at the 1996 data, Cronbach's alpha for the three-item efficacy index is .5405. 
However, the 1996 scale's overall reliability decreases if any of the three items is deleted. 
The inter-item correlations can be found in Table 2 below. 
85 Balch; Braima; Finkel; and Acock et al. 
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0 The reliability analyses were conducted using NES 1992-1997 aggregate data, so the difference in 
sample sizes between 1992 efficacy index results and 1996 efficacy index results reflect the smaller number of 
people who took the 1992 post-election survey vs. the number who took the 1996 post-election survey. 











These results replicate the findings ofNiemi et al., who also showed that the NOSAY 
and NOCARE items - which are supposed to measure internal efficacy and external efficacy, 
respectively - are more highly correlated than the NOSA Y and COMPLEX variables, which 
are both supposed to measure internal efficacy. 86 Niemi and his co-authors have argued 
vehemently that the NES three-item efficacy index is not reliable, even as a unit. However, 
since it is how the NES most consistently measures efficacy, the three-item scale will be 
used, but no attempt will be made to distinguish between internal and external efficacy. 
The distributions of scores on the efficacy index appear to be normally distributed in 
both 1992 and in 1996. 87 The full range of possible scores is represented in each sample, with 
relatively few people falling at the low and high ends of3 and 15 and about 75 percent 
falling in the middle range between 6 and 12. The mean efficacy score in 1992 was 8.76, and 
the mean efficacy score in 1996 was 7.91, reflecting an overall decrease in feelings of 
political empowerment between the two elections. 
Political Cynicism 
Political cynicism, defined by Cappella and Jamieson as a lack of trust in officials and 
the system they govern, 88 was measured in the 1992 and 1996 post-election surveys with 
respondents' answers to the four following items, which appeared in both surveys: 
"People have different ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don't 
refer to Democrats or Republicans in particular, but just to the government in general. We 
want to see how you feel about these ideas. For example ... " 
86 Niemi et al. 
87 See Appendix A for variable distributions. 
88 Cappella and Jamieson. 
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1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in 
Washington to do what is right -just about always, most of the time, or 
only some of the time? 
2. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay 
in taxes, waste some ofit, or don't waste very much ofit? 
3. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 
4. Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are 
crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are 
crooked? 
Possible responses to the four questions differed in range, but the ranges were 
consistent between the 1992 and the 1996 surveys. For both surveys, answers were recoded 
so that high scores would indicate high levels of cynicism and low scores would indicate low 
levels of cynicism. For each item, the possible answers and coding are listed below: 
1. 1 - ''just about always"; 2 - "most of the time"; 3 - "some of the time"; and 
4 - "none of the time."89 
2. 1 - "not very much"; 2 - "some"; 3 - "a lot." 
3. 1 - ''for the benefit of all"; and 2 - "by a few big interests." 
4. 1 - "hardly any"; 2 - "not very many of them"; 3 - "quite a few of them." 
89 ''None of the time" was not a prompted response; it was coded only when voluntarily offered by the 
respondent. 
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An additive cynicism scale thus ranges from 4 to 12, with 4 indicating relatively low 
levels of cynicism and 12 indicating relatively high levels of cynicism. 
A reliability analysis of the 1992 and 1996 cynicism scales yields Cronbach alpha 
coefficients of .5977 and .6158, respectively. The reliabilities are not as high as one might 
hope to ensure the items being used are measuring a single, respective concept, but that is a 
hazard of using less-than-perfect survey items- such as the NES Trust in Government scale 
-for the purpose of maintaining core survey data that is comparable over time. 
In any case, for both years, deletion of any one of the four cynicism items lowers the 
overall reliability of the scale. The inter-item correlations are high enough to indicate one 
concept is being measured, but low enough to avoid any problems with multi-collinearity. 
The matrices are in tables 3 and 4 below. 


















a As with the efficacy scores, the reliability samples were drawn from 1992-1997 cumulative data 
and reflect the number of people who responded to the 1992 and 1996 post-election surveys. 
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The distributions of cynicism scores are skewed toward the high end. 90 In 1992, the 
lowest possible score of 4 is not even represented, although it was in 1996. In both years, the 
frequencies of each score escalate all the way to 10 or 11, at which point they drop 
dramatically for the remaining, highest-possible score of 12. About 75 percent of the sample 
in both years falls between 9 and 11. The mean cynicism scores for 1992 and 1996 are 9.56 
and 9.36, respectively, indicating little appreciable change between the two elections. 
Candidate Evaluations 
To measure what respondents have learned from their use of and attention to 
television vs. newspapers, a ratio was calculated to indicate whether a respondent was more 
likely to evaluate presidential candidates based on personal qualities or issue positions. Those 
90 See Appendix B. 
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who have person "chronicity," defined by Erber and Lau as a relative accessibility of 
cognitive schema, tend to mention attributes that are specific to the person running for office 
(e.g., ''He's a good man," "He has a lot of experience," "He gets things done.") Those who 
have an issue chronicity tend to mention attributes related to the candidate's or the party's 
positions on issues ( e.g., "He's pro-life," "He will do a lot for the environment," "I like his 
tax plan.") 
The score was constructed by analyzing responses to the following open-ended 
questions, which appeared in both the 1992 and 1996 pre-election surveys: 
''Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the major 
candidates for president. Is there anything in particular about (Mr. Bush) that 
might make you want to vote for himT'91 
"Is there anything particular about (Mr. Bush) that might make you want to 
vote against him?'' 
"Is there anything in particular about (Mr. Clinton) that might make you want 
to vote for him?'' 
91 For 1996, the names in parentheses were replaced with Mr. Dole, Mr. Clinton and Mr. Perot. The wording 
remained the same. Questions about presidential candidates were used instead of questions about local 
candidates to ensure the comparability of responses across the nation. However, any comparison of impressions 
between 1992 and 1996 must take into account that Mr. Clinton was the only candidate involved in both 
elections. 
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"Is there anything in particular about (Mr. Clinton) that might make you want 
to vote against him?" 
These are open-ended responses in which the respondent is encouraged to offer up to 
five likes and five dislikes with regard to all of the candidates. Conveniently, the responses 
have been coded by the Survey Research Center into 10 categories: Experience/ Ability, 
Personal Qualities, Party Connections, Government Management, Miscellaneous, 
Government Activity/Philosophy, Domestic Policies, Foreign Policies, Group Connections 
and Events Unique to One Campaign. Using the precoded groupings, it was fairly easy to 
combine appropriate groups and recode them into person-based comments and issue-based 
comments. 
For this study, person-based comments were considered those that had originally been 
coded into three categories: "candidate only - experience, ability; candidate only - candidate 
leadership qualities; and candidate only - personal qualities." "Candidate only - party 
connections" was not included because it included such comments as "maybe the country 
needs a third party" and "mention of issues that vice-presidential candidate is identified 
with," comments that clearly introduce confounding variables. Using the three categories 
meant there were 123 possible candidate-oriented responses. 
Issue-based comments were considered those that had originally been coded into two 
categories: "party or candidate -domestic policies" and "party or candidate- foreign 
policies," which meant there were 292 possible issue-oriented responses. 
Erber and Lau's method was used for person-based vs. issue-based responses, in 
which a person chronicity score and an issue chronicity score were calculated for each 
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respondent to measure her or his tendency to make one type of comment or the other.92 Using 
this method, the candidate-based comments made by a respondent are considered as a group, 
regardless of which candidate he or she is referring to, and the issue-based comments made 
by a respondent are considered as a group. The comments are weighted according to the 
order in which they are mentioned; the assertion, based in schema theory, is that the first 
comment a person makes will reflect a concept that is more accessible in the person's mind 
than that which is mentioned second, and so on. 
In this study, the comments that were mentioned first were given a score of 5, those 
that came second were given a score of 4, those that were third were scored 3, those that were 
fourth were 2, and those that were fifth and last were 1. So instead of simply summing the 
total number of issue or candidate mentions ( 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 for someone who mentioned 
five) the relative weights were summed (5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + I for someone who named five). The 
candidate and issue weights are then summed separately, and each is divided by the overall 
sum of candidate and issue summed weights, resulting in two scores - one for candidate 
chronicity and one for issue chronicity. 
For the purposes of this study, a further step was added to the calculation. To simplify 
the modei a ratio between candidate-based and issue-based tendencies was created to serve 
as the final candidate-evaluation variable. The equation for the variable was as follows: eval 
= P - I / P + I. The scores thus range from + 1 to -1, with + 1 representing a total inclination to 
name candidate-based characteristics and -1 representing a total inclination to name issue-
based characteristics. 
92 Erber and Lau. 
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The distribution of candidate-evaluation scores is double-bowed, with most people 
scoring -1, + 1 or 0.93 
The mean candidate evaluation score for 1992 is -.00111, and the mean candidate 
evaluation score for 1996 is .2892. The difference between the two means indicates a greater 
tendency among voters in 1996 to evaluate candidates based on personal characteristics, 
whereas in 1992 voters tended to evaluate candidates based on issues and personal 
characteristics equally. 
Media Use and Attention 
Drew and Weaver have argued that any media-effects study should include measures 
of both exposure and attention.94 Following a method used by Brians and Wattenberg, a 
television and newspaper score was calculated for each respondent by multiplying exposure 
and attention measures for each medium. 95 
Use of and attention to newspapers and television for campaign information were 
measured at Time 1 and Time 2, using the following four items from the 1992 and 1996 pre-
election surveys: 
1. "How many days in the past week did you watch the news on TV?" 
93 See Appendix A for distributions. 
94 Drew, D. and Weaver, D. (1990.) "Media attention, media exposure, and media effects." Journalism 
Quarterly, 67, 4:740-748. 
95 Brians, C.L. and Wattenberg, M.P. (1996.) "Campaign issue knowledge and salience: Comparing reception 
from TV commercials, TV news, and newspapers." American Journal of Political Science, 40, 1 : 172-193. 
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2. "How much attention did you pay to news on TV about the campaign for 
president - a great deal, quite a bit, some, very little, or none?'' 
3. "How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper? 
4. "How much attention did you pay to newspaper articles about the campaign 
for president - a great deal, quite a bit, some, very little, or none?" 
Answers to the exposure questions (i.e., how many days in the past week respondents 
watched the news on TV or read a daily newspaper) were coded 0-7, and answers to the 
attention questions (i.e., how much attention respondents paid to news about the campaign) 
were coded I, indicating no attention was paid, through 5, indicating a great deal of attention 
was paid. 
Each respondent's coded answers were multiplied, and the subsequent scores ranged 
from 0-35. For instance, someone who said he or she watched television news every day in 
the past week but paid no attention to news about the campaign on television would score a 
7, less than someone who watched television news only two days in the past week but paid a 
great deal of attention to news about the campaign; that person would score a 10. The 
thinking is that the person who watched television news every day probably was exposed to 
some news about the campaign, if only peripherally (maybe he or she chose to read a book 
during that segment). In contrast, the person who watched television news only two days in 
the past week but paid a great deal of attention to news about the campaign logged more time 
attending to news about the campaign, which is what concerns this study. 
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Like candidate evaluations, a ratio was then calculated to determine the relative 
extent to which people attended more to campaign news on television vs. newspapers. The 
ratio was calculated with the following formula: Media Use= TV -Newspaper/ TV+ 
Newspaper. The scores thus ranged from+ 1 to -1, with+ 1 indicated a total tendency toward 
television and -1 representing a total tendency toward newspapers. 
The ratios were set up to expect a positive relationship between the media and 
candidate-evaluation variables; those who relied more on television, represented by + 1, were 
expected to exhibit a tendency toward naming person-based likes and dislikes of candidates, 
also represented by + 1. The distributions for media use resemble those for candidate 
evaluations - a high number of people register + 1, -1 and 0. The mean media use score in 
1992 was .3046, while the mean in 1996 was .1884- again, reflecting a difference between 
the two elections; it appears that people were more likely to glean their campaign news from 
television in 1992 than in 1996.96 
Data Analysis 
This study uses both path analysis and panel data. Using path analysis to analyze 
large-scale, cross-sectional data over time is the best way of establishing time-order causal 
relationships and discerning direct and indirect effects that can be generalized to the general 
population, while panel data can be used to replicate longitudinal findings and illuminate 
individual change that may be ~ccurring over time.97 A preliminary analysis of this study's 
key variables' stability over time indicated that enough change was taking place to warrant a 
96 See Appendix A. 
97 For this study, a full panel replication was not possible because leaving out the 545 panel respondents from 
the 1992 cross-sectional data resulted in large amounts of missing data. 
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panel analysis. The highest stability ( with a 1992-1996 correlation of .670) occurred in 
respondents' media use and attention. The most change occurred in candidate evaluations 
( 1992-1996 correlation of .190). 
Thus, two path analyses were conducted - one for 1992 and one for 1996 - to test the 
hypothesized model of media use and attention, candidate evaluations, cynicism and efficacy 
at the aggregate level. Based on the simplex model that has been hypothesized, the following 
( standardized) equations were used for each of the path analyses: 
Eq. 1: EFFICACY= p l(CYNICISM) + fi2(EV AL)+ fi3(MED1A) + fW(AGE) + fi5(GENDER) + fi6(EDUC) + fi7(1NCOME) + fi8(1NTEREST) 
Eq: 2: CYNICISM= p 1 (EV AL)+ P2(MED1A) + P3(AGE) + fW(GENDER) + PS(EDUC) + P6(INCOME) + P7(1NTEREST) 
Eq. 3: EV AL= pt(MEDIA) + P2(AGE) + P3(GENDER) + fW(EDUC) + P5(INCOME) + P6(INTEREST) 
Eq. 4: MEDIA= fil(AGE) + P2(GENDER) + P3(EDUC) + fW(INCOME) + P5(INTEREST) 
A panel analysis then follows, with the purpose of more stringently testing the 
hypothesized time order of the variables and uncovering any individual-level change that 
may be hidden in the cross-sectional data The two path analyses were conducted using 
ordinary least-squares regression with SPSS 9.0 software, a forced-entry procedure and 
listwise deletion of missing data. 
Using 1992-96 panel data, cross-lagged correlations between causal variables 
measured at Time 1 and their respective dependent variables at Time 2 were calculated using 
the following (standardized) least-squares regression equations: 
Eq 1: MEDIA (Time 2)= Pl[MEDIA (Time 1)] + P2[EVAL (Time l)] + ((33 + l}4 + ps + p6 + P7)DEMOGRAPHICS 
Eq 2: EV AL (Time 2) = p I [EV AL (Time I)]+ P2[MED1A (Time 1 )] + (P3 + fW + ps + P6 + P7)DEMOGRAPHICS 
Eq 3: EVAL (Time 2) = pt[EVAL (Time 1)] + P2[CYNICISM (Time 1)] + (P3 + fW + ps + P6 + fi7)DEMOORAPHICS 
Eq4: CYNICISM(Time2)= fH[CYNICISM (Time 1)) + P2[EVAL(Time 1)) + (P3 + fW + ps + P6 + P7)DEMOORAPHICS 
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Eq 5: CYNICISM (Time 2) = fH[CYNICISM (Time 1)] + p2[EFFICACY (Time I)]+ (P3 + fW + ps + P6 + P7)DEMOGRAPHICS 
Eq 6: EFFICACY (Time 2) = pt[EFFICACY (Time l)J + P2[CYNICISM (Time l)J + (P3 + fW + ps + P6 + P7)DEMOGRAPHICS 
Again, a forced-entry procedure and listwise deletion of missing data were used. The 
reverse relationships (Eqs. 1, 3 and 5) were calculated to rule out any reciprocal effects. One 
limitation to the panel data used is that the waves were four years apart instead of two, 
making for a long gestation period from the time of media use and attention to candidate 
evaluations; from candidate evaluations to levels of cynicism; and from cynicism to efficacy. 
Much could have happened in the intervening years to skew the results. For instance, 
midterm elections were held in 1994 that may have affected people's levels of cynicism, 
either inflating or suppressing the actual effect that candidate evaluations might have had on 
cynicism. 
A preliminary analysis showed that five of seven possible control variables warranted 
inclusion in the model: age, education, household income, gender and campaign interest. 
Party identification and race did not affect the results. The five remaining descriptive 
variables were controlled throughout the cross-lagged correlation regressions, and they 
served as exogenous variables acting on media use and attention in the path analyses. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Combining path analysis with cross-lagged analysis proved to be an effective way of 
evaluating the theories related to media use, candidate evaluations, cynicism and efficacy that 
had been suggested by the literature. The hypothesized model was partially supported by the 
data. The 1992 data revealed nine direct paths in the model, and the 1996 data revealed 13 
direct paths. The large majority of significant effects were direct rather than indirect. The 
cross-lagged analysis provided evidence of one time-ordered relationship among the three 
that were hypothesized.98 The following results are broken down by hypothesis and divided 
into three groups: 1992 path analysis, 1996 path analysis and 1992-96 cross-lagged analysis. 
1992 Path Analysis 
Hl: Political cynicism leads to lower feelings of political efficacy. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported. When regressed on political efficacy, political cynicism 
demonstrated a standardized regression coefficient of-.205, significant at the .001 level. The 
more cynical people were, the less powerful they felt. Cynicism and all the variables 
preceding it in the model combined to explain 22 percent of the total variance in 1992 levels 
of efficacy. 
H2: Adopting an approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue-oriented 
will lead to higher political cynicism. 
98 See Appendix B for a zero-order correlation matrix of the key variables under study. 
57 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. While the regression coefficient of .064 was in the 
hypothesized direction, it was not significant, and candidate evaluations worked with the 
variables preceding it in the model to explain only 1.8 percent of the variance in 1992 levels 
of cynicism. There appears to be little support for the theory that adopting a person-oriented 
approach to politics over an issue-oriented approach leads to higher levels of cynicism. 
H3: Using and paying attention to television more than newspapers will nurture an 
approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue-oriented. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. People who used and paid attention to television 
more than newspapers for their campaign information were not more likely to mention 
personal qualities than issues as reasons to vote for or against the candidates. The direction of 
the regression coefficient, though not significant, was actually opposite that which was 
expected. 
The descriptive variables explained 12.9 percent of the variance in media use and 
attention, and the only ones that were not significant were income and campaign interest. 
Age and education were negatively correlated with the ratio of television to newspaper use 
and attention; those who were older and more educated were more likely to read and pay 
attention to newspapers than to watch and pay attention to television. Gender showed a 
substantial positive correlation with the media ratio; women were more likely to watch and 
pay attention to television than to read and pay attention to newspapers. 
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Figure 6 below is a path diagram showing all correlations that were significant at the 
.05 level or above and the total variance explained at each step in the model. 
Several relationships are interesting to note. While none of the demographic variables 
was associated with cynicis~ three of them were associated with efficacy. As might be 
expected, those who were more highly educated, earned a higher income and had more 
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Another point of interest is that while those who were older and more educated were 
more likely to use and pay attention to newspapers than to television, they were substantially 
more likely to mention personal qualities than issues as reasons to vote for or against the 
candidates. 
Decomposing the significant correlations from the 1992 path model showed that none 
of the endogenous variables in the 1992 model were indirectly affected by any preceding 
variables. This seemed largely because of the missing links between the media ratio and the 
evaluation ratio and between the evaluation ratio and cynicism. Furthermore, cynicism was 
not predicted by any of the variables preceding it, so efficacy experienced no indirect effects 
through cynicism. The decomposition is illustrated in Table 5. 
1996 Path Analysis 
Hl: Political cynicism leads to lower feelings of political efficacy. 
Hypothesis 1 was strongly supported. When regressed on political efficacy, political 
cynicism demonstrated a standardized regression coefficient of -.351, significant at the .001 
level. One standard unit of political cynicism lowered people's sense of 
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Education = -.139 
Age= .233 
Education= .239 
Education = .231 
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Indirect Effects 
political efficacy more than 3/10 of a standard unit. The results replicated those found in the 
1992 path analysis, and the combined model served to explain 25.9 percent of the total 
variance in efficacy - more variance than was explained in 1992 levels of efficacy. 
H2: Adopting an approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue-oriented 
will lead to higher political cynicism. 
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Hypothesis 2 was supported. The relationship between candidate evaluations and 
cynicism was a modest .083, significant at the .05 level. Those who were more likely to 
mention personal qualities than issues as reasons to vote for or against candidates showed 
higher levels of cynicism in 1996. However, candidate evaluations and all the variables 
preceding it in the model accounted for only 1.3 percent of the variance in cynicism- not too 
strong an argument for its explanatory value. 
H3: Using and paying attention to television more than newspapers will nurture an 
approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue-oriented. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Again, people who used and paid attention to 
television more than newspapers for their campaign information were not more likely to 
mention personal qualities than issues as reasons to vote for or against the candidates As in 
the 1992 path analysis, the direction of the coefficient was opposite that which was predicted, 
but it was insignificant. 
A big difference between the 1992 and 1996 models lies in the relationships of the 
exogenous, descriptive variables to media use and attention. All five of the control variables 
were significant in 1996. Age, education and gender all showed the same relationship they 
did in 1992: Those who were older and more educated were more likely to read and pay 
attention to newspapers than to watch and pay attention to television, and women were more 
likely to watch and pay attention to television than to read and pay attention to newspapers. 
While income and campaign interest were not significant in 1992, they were in 1996; those 
with higher household incomes were more likely to read and pay attention to newspapers, as 
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were those who reported more interest in the campaign. Overaa thoug~ the demographic 
variables explained 7.7 percent of the variance in media use and attention- less variance than 
was explained in 1992. 
Figure 7 is a path diagram showing all correlations that were significant at the .05 
level or above and the total variance explained at each step in the model. 
Several relationships seen in the 1992 data resurfaced in the 1996 path analysis. A 
substantial correlation was demonstrated between cynicism and efficacy. Education and 
income also affected efficacy in the same, positive direction they did in 1992. Age, however, 
also showed a significant association with efficacy - but in a negative direction. The older 
respondents were, the less politically efficacious they felt. Age and education again predicted 
use of and attention to newspapers over television, but again, those who were older and more 
educated were more likely to name personal qualities than issue stances as reasons to vote for 
or against the candidates. 
There was no significant path between the media ratio and the candidate-evaluation 
ratio. However, in contrast to 1992, a modest, direct path emerged between candidate 
evaluation and cynicism in 1996, and it was in the direction hypothesized: Those who were 
more likely to evaluate candidates on the basis of personal qualities instead of on issue 
positions reported higher levels of cynicism than those who were more likely to evaluate 
candidates on their issue positions. 
Decomposing the significant correlations in the 1996 path model into direct and 
indirect effects yielded little more information. However, unlike the 1992 data, the 1996 data 
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Figure 7. 1996 path coefficients (a= .05). 
indirect effects on political efficacy. But the direct paths between age and efficacy, and 
education and efficacy, were more substantial than the three-step effects the two 
demographic variables had via candidate evaluations and cynicism. Age and education also 
affected cynicism indirectly through candidate evaluations. Both are positive relationships; 
the older and more educated people were, the slightly more cynical they were because of 
their tendency to take a person-oriented approach to the presidential campaign. Candidate 
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evaluation had a slightly negative, indirect relationship with political efficacy through 
cynicism. The decomposition is illustrated in Table 6. 
Cross-Lagged Analysis 
Hl: Political cynicism leads to lower feelings of political efficacy. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported for a third time. The standardized cross-lagged 
regression coefficient between 1992 cynicism and 1996 efficacy indicated this part of the 
model was sequenced correctly. A correlation of-.119, significant at the .005 level, existed 
between levels of cynicism in 1992 and levels of efficacy in 1996. Cynicism toward politics 
appeared to precede low feelings of political efficacy. The reverse correlation was not 
significant. 
H2: Adopting an approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue-oriented 
will lead to higher political cynicism. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. The direction of the cross-lagged regression 
coefficient was positive, as expected, but it was not significant. Panel respondents who had 
adopted a person-oriented approach to politics in 1992 were not more cynical in 1996. The 
reverse cross-lagged coefficient was actually larger than the hypothesized one, and it was 
significant at the .10 level, suggesting those who were more cynical in 1992 were more likely 
to use a person-oriented approach to the 1996 presidential campaign. 
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H3: Using and paying attention to television more than newspapers will nurture an 
approach to politics that is more person-oriented than issue oriented. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. There was a standardized cross-lagged regression 
coefficient of .063 between 1992 media use and 1996 candidate evaluations, but it was not 
significant. The reverse coefficient was not significant, either. Those who used and paid 
attention to television more than newspapers were not more likely to name personal qualities 
than issues as reasons to vote for or against presidential candidates. 
Figure 8 presents diagrams of the three time-ordered relationships tested with the 
panel data. All coefficients and their standard errors are reported; those with asterisks were 
significant. 
Summary 
The clearest success of the proposed model was the time-ordered relationship 
between political cynicism and political efficacy. Hypothesis 1, which predicted that 
Table 7. Support for hypotheses in three analyses. 
1992 Path 1996 Path Cross-Lagged 
Hyp. 1 (Cynicism-+ Low Efficacy) * * * 
Hyp. 2 (Personality Candidate Evals -+ Cynicism) * 
Hyp. 3 (Television Use/Attention-+ Personality Candidate Evals) 
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- .670 (.000) 
'92 Media Use and Attention ------------- '96 Media Use and Attention 
'92 Candidate Evaluations '96 Candidate Evaluations 
..,... .194 (.001) 
'92 Candidate Evaluations 
.190 (.000) 
--------------, '96 Candidate Evaluations 
.065 (.157) 
.-. .450 (.000) 
.426 (.000) 
'92 Gynicism '96 Cynicism 
------- -.119 (.004) 
'92 Efficacy '96 Efficacy 
- .329 (.000) 
Figure 8. 1992-96 cross-lagged regression coefficients. 
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cynicism toward politics would lead to lower feelings of political efficacy, was supported in 
all three analyses. Hypothesis 2, which predicted that a person-oriented approach to 
candidate evaluations would lead to feelings of cynicism, was minimally supported. And 
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that relative use of and attention to television over newspapers 
would lead to a person-oriented approach over an issue-oriented approach toward politics, 
received no support at all. Table 7 summarizes support for the hypotheses. An asterisk 
indicates the hypothesis was supported. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
This study enjoyed at least one large success, which was establishing a time-ordered, 
negative relationship between political cynicism and feelings of political efficacy. Austin and 
Pinkleton had hypothesized that cynicism would be positively correlated with political 
efficacy, reasoning that those who considered themselves wise to the world of politics might 
think others were not so clever and thus might enjoy an inflated sense of their own 
effectiveness. 99 Litt also had predicted that cynicism would lead to greater efficacy through a 
sense of solidarity with others who are dissatisfied. 100 Such logic predicting a positive 
correlation between cynicism and efficacy is misguided. 
Hypothesis 1 of this study, which predicted that cynicism toward politics would lead 
to lower feelings of political efficacy, was supported by the 1992 path analysis, the 1996 path 
analysis and the 1992-96 cross-lagged analysis. Those who do not trust government to do the 
right thing, to operate with electorate's general interest at heart, to use tax money wisely and 
to act within the law are not likely to feel they can do much to influence the political process. 
Researchers and political pundits have gotten a lot of mileage out of the public's 
disenfranchisement from politics. Ofte~ the various components of political alienation are 
assumed to co-exist - or to have come about simultaneously, as if they were part and parcel 
of the same problem This study suggests, rather, that a time-ordered relationship exists 
between two of these concepts: cynicism and political efficacy. If voters are to feel 
empowered, it is clear - from these data, at least - that their feelings of cynicism toward the 
99 Austin, E.W. and Pinkleton, B.E. (1995) "Positive and negative effects of political disaffection on the less 
experienced voter." Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 39, 2:215-235. 
100 Litt, E. (1963) "Political cynicism and political futility." The Journal of Politics, 25, 2:312-323. 
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political system must first be neutralized. If voters do not trust public officials and the system 
those officials gove~ they will not be confident in their ability to influence the political 
process. The reverse does not appear to be true, however. It does not seem possible to "fix" 
people's cynicism toward politics by convincing them they can make a difference. 
Working backwards in the model, there was minimal support for the theory that a 
tendency to evaluate presidential candidates on the basis of personal qualities rather than 
issue stances would lead to greater feelings of cynicism. In Spiral of Cynicism, Cappella and 
Jamieson had argued that "soundbite" news coverage of campaigns, which they argued has 
become more episodic, image-based and strategy-focused rather than issue-oriented, is 
leading the public to become more cynical. In addition, Erber and Lau had found that the way 
people process political information influences their levels of cynicism, discovering that 
"person chronics," those whose cynicism was predicted by their evaluation of incumbents, 
were greater in number among "issue chronics," those whose cynicism was predicted by the 
distance between their issue stances and those of officials. This study only partially supported 
those findings.· 
Hypothesis 2, which predicted that a person-oriented approach to candidate 
evaluations would lead to feelings of cynicism, was modestly supported by the 1996 path· 
analysis, but not by the 1992 path analysis or the 1992-96 cross-lagged analysis. When 
giving reasons to vote for or against presidential candidates, those who were more likely to 
mention personal qualities, such as "He's a good man," "He's trustworthy," or "He cares 
about people," were no more likely to be cynical than those who mentioned issue 
characteristics, such as "I don't like his views on abortion" or "He would solve the problems 
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we have with Social Security." Moreover, cynicism was hardly predicted by any variables in 
the model - even exogenous, descriptive variables such as age, education and income. 
The lack of effects between candidate evaluations and cynicism might be due in part 
to the detail with which the evaluation variable was constructed. Forming a weighted ratio of 
personal qualities to issues might have concealed any effects that specific responses would 
have demonstrated if they had been analyzed separately. Mining answers to the NES open-
ended likes/dislikes item for personal qualities that specifically relate to the trust issues 
tapped by the cynicism measure might be a better way of determining whether a time-ordered 
relationship exists between cognitions and attitudes. More generally, additional research 
clearly must be done to understand the causes and correlates of cynicism. 
As politicians' personal scandals make headlines with growing regularity and surveys 
show an electorate increasingly cynical toward the political process that governs them, it is 
important to understand how and why people come to hold such a distrustful attitude. If 
demographic variables such as age, gender, education and income do not explain differing 
levels of cynicism, perhaps the attitude is less a sociological one than a psychological one. 
Maybe the strongest correlate of cynicism lies in people's personal experiences, which could 
vary across demographic groups and might be unrelated to media coverage of politics. At the 
very least, this study suggested that researchers are overlooking some key variables affecting 
people's trust of government officials. These data indicate that cynicism defies the 
explanations researchers have suggested so far. 
As for the first step in the hypothesized model, this study offered no support for the 
theory that watching and paying attention to television yields different cognitive results than 
reading and paying attention to newspapers. Keeter had demonstrated that a candidate's 
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personal qualities had been more important for the television-dependent than for the 
newspaper-dependent in every presidential election from 1964-1980. In additio°' television 
repeatedly has been criticized for presenting political news that is episodic, abbreviated, 
dependent on images and rooted in conflict while newspapers are thought to provide 
coverage that is in-depth, issue-related, locally driven and thoughtful. 101 This study serves as 
an extension of Graber's content analysis, which found no differences in coverage quality 
between the two media, by suggesting there also are no differences in cognitive effects the 
two media have on their audiences. 
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that relative use of and attention to television over 
newspapers would lead to a person-oriented approach over an issue-oriented approach 
toward politics, was not supported by the 1992 path analysis, the 1996 path analysis or the 
1992-96 cross-lagged analysis. Those who watched and paid more attention to television 
were no more likely than those who read and paid attention to newspapers to mention 
personal qualities over issues as reasons they would vote for or against presidential 
candidates. 
There are several possible explanations for this, which provide fodder for future 
research. Perhaps television news, by breaking complex issues into easily digestible talking 
points, has made those issues more accessible to the public. Or maybe the soft-money issue 
advertisements on television that are chided for their presumed negative impact on the 
101 See, for example, Robinson, M.J. (1976) "Public-affairs television and the growth of political malaise: The 
case of 'The Selling of the Pentagon."' The American Political Science Review, 70, 2:409-432; and, for an 
overview of the literature, Newton, K. ( 1999) "Mass media effects: Mobilization or media malaise?" British 
Journal of Political Science, 29, 4:577-599. Atkin, C. K., and W. Gantz (1978). ''Television news and political 
socialization." Public Opinion Quarterly, 42, 183:-198; Becker, L.B. and Whitney, D.C. (1980) "Effects of 
media dependencies: Audience assessment of government." Communication Research, 7, I :95-120; Newton, K. 
(1990); and Robinson, M.J. (1976). 
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political climate actually serve to educate the public. Brians and Wattenberg, for example, 
found that exposure and attention to television campaign advertisements were better 
predictors of issue knowledge and orientation than exposure and attention to either television 
news or newspapers. 102 
The culprit may also be a methodological one. This study measured television use and 
attention relative to newspaper use and attention, an operationalization that demonstrates the 
balance of a person's media use rather than the volume ofit. This type of measure was used 
because it was an efficient way to test a model positing different effects from television and 
newspaper use; the downside to such an operationalization is that it introduces the potential 
for a suppressor effect. It's possible that had the amount of television and newspaper use and 
attention been studied separately, more substantial effects would have emerged. In addition, 
this study did not include a control variable indicating whether people had watched the 
televised debates. Those who were greater television users likely would have watched the 
debates and might have learned more about the issues from those broadcasts than newspaper 
readers learned from the next day's paper. 
There is another possibility that would be consistent with Graber's results. While she 
found that television and newspaper coverage of politics did not differ in their ratio of 
personality to issue news, she found that they did differ in the range of coverage they 
provided- and it's possible that differences in effects between the two media might follow 
the same pattern. Perhaps those who use and pay attention to television are likely to name the 
same number of personal qualities and issues as those who use and pay attention to 
newspapers, but perhaps television viewers are likely to name a narrower range of personal 
102 Brians, C.L. and Wattenberg, M.P. (1996.) (ibid.) 
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qualities and issues. Put another way, perhaps the media depiction used by television viewers 
to evaluate candidates presents the same balance between personality and issues as the media 
depiction used by newspaper readers - but perhaps it is smaller in scope. 
Regarding any attitudinal effects of the two media, no direct paths emerged between 
media use and attention and either political cynicism or political efficacy. This is curious, in 
light of all the literature suggesting relationships between them. It may be that McLeod and 
McDonald are correct in arguing that inconsistent media measures and simple-exposure 
measures lie at the root of mixed results regarding media effects. 103 Besides Brians and 
Wattenberg, few researchers have combined measures of exposure and attention into one 
variable. 104 Several researchers have used variables measuring the relative use of television 
and newspapers, but perhaps welding four survey responses about media use into a single 
ratio suppressed effects that would have appeared had any one of the items stood alone. 
Furthermore, researchers over the years have raised concerns about the standard NES 
indices used to measure cynicism and efficacy. The Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the 
indices in this study were well below the acceptable level of. 70. The reliability coefficients 
for the efficacy indices in 1992 and 1996 were .6228 and .5405, respectively; the reliability 
coefficients for the cynicism indices in 1992 and 1996 were .5977 and .6158, respectively. 
Niemi and his co-authors have argued vehemently that the NES three-item efficacy index is 
neither reliable nor valid, and a set of pilot studies found that an efficacy index they proposed 
to replace the old items achieved greater internal and external consistency. 105 However, 
changing the items at this point would dilute researchers' ability to compare results over 
103 McLeod, J.M. and McDonald, D.G. (1985.) (ibid) 
104 Brians, C.L. and Wattenberg, M.P. (1996.) (ibid) 
105 Niemi et al. ( I 991.) (ibid.) 
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time, and for now the NES community seems to be in favor of leaving the indices where they 
are so as not to undermine 50 years of research. One solution might be to both leave the old 
measures and include new ones so that studies of cynicism and efficacy in recent years could 
make use of the better measures without spoiling researchers' plans to study long-term 
changes. 
Speculation aside, these data make one thing clear: Researchers and others must not 
assume television is leading the public away from the issues. In direct contrast, the data come 
close to showing that those who are more exposed and pay more attention to television are 
more likely to name issue positions as things they like or dislike about presidential 
candidates. More research is undoubtedly needed to understand the role that television and 
other media play in the public's evaluations of candidates for public office and subsequent 
attitudes toward government. That television has led to "personality politics" is an 
assumption that has gone unchecked far too long. 
This study was inhibited by three major limitations: 1) It should have been possible to 
eliminate all panel participants from the path analysis in order to allow a true replication 
between the two methods; 2) four years is too long for a panel study of cognitions and 
attitudes; and 3) again, the NES items used to measure political efficacy are not the best · 
available. 
Regarding the first limitation, any true replication of results requires total 
independence between samples- something that was not possible with the NES 1992-97 data 
set. Though evidence for the first hypothesis was strong because it was supported by all three 
data analyses, it must be noted that the panel data used in the cross-lagged analysis was 
duplicated in the cross-sectional data used for the 1992 and 1996 path analyses. Therefore, it 
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is possible that panel analysis with a truly independent sample might have demonstrated a 
more moderate replication of results. 
Secondly, it would have been beneficial to analyze a third wave that tested two-year 
change instead of four-year change, had comparable 1994 data been available. Smith found 
the strongest predictors of 1992 levels of efficacy to be 1990 levels of campaign interest, 
political discussion and attention, suggesting that a two-year flow of effects was at work. 
This study was unable to study the possibility of such a two-year interval between each of the 
variables in the model, and it is possible the model might have gained more support from a 
shorter gestation period between variables. 
A final limitation involved the three items used to measure political efficacy: 1) I 
don't think public officials care much what people like me think; 2) people like me have no 
say about the what government does; and 3) sometimes politics is so complicated that a 
person like me really can't understand what's going on. Niemi et al. designed survey items to 
measure political efficacy that were more reliable and more valid than those used in the NES 
surveys. However, the three-item efficacy index has remained part of the surveys for the sake 
of over-time continuity, and it's possible that a better measure would yield different results. 
Despite its limitations, this study suggests several avenues for future research: 
Researchers should explore the effects of combining media exposure and attention measures 
into a single variable; content analyses should be used in combination with effects studies to 
test assumptions regarding coverage as well as assumptions regarding what effects specific 
coverage has on the electorate, and, finally, efficacy should be studied as a specific 
orientation that is affected by other, more diffuse orientations such as cynicism. 
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In order to maintain a healthy democracy, people must feel they can influence the 
political process. This study suggests that in order to reach that end, people's trust in 
government officials must be restored. Without a solid grasp of the causes and correlates of 
cynicism, effecting such change within the electorate looks to be a daunting task. Cynicism 
appears to be a more nebulous phenomenon than it is given credit for. Without fully 
understanding it, cynicism may be with us for a while - and voter participation may continue 
along the disappointing lines seen in 1996. 
78 
APPENDIX A: FREQUENCIES AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
Political Efficacy 
Statistics 
92 Efficacy 96 Efficacy 
- Index - Index 
N Valid 990 1520 
Missing 1449 919 
Mean 8.7616 7.9066 
Range 12.00 12.00 
1992 Efficacy - Index 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 3.00 43 1.8 4.3 4.3 
4.00 44 1.8 4.4 8.8 
5.00 56 2.3 5.7 14.4 
6.00 104 4.3 10.5 24.9 
7.00 98 4.0 9.9 34.8 
8.00 119 4.9 12.0 46.9 
9.00 104 4.3 10.5 57.4 
10.00 127 5.2 12.8 70.2 
11.00 113 4.6 11.4 81.6 
12.00 74 3.0 7.5 89.1 
13.00 53 2.2 5.4 94.4 
14.00 24 1.0 2.4 96.9 
15.00 31 1.3 3.1 100.0 
Total 990 40.6 100.0 
Missing System 1449 59.4 
Total 2439 100.0 
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92 Efficacy - Index 
1996 Efficacy ·- Index 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 3.00 66 2.7 4.3 4.3 
4.00 83 3.4 5.5 9.8 
5.00 138 5.7 9.1 18.9 
6.00 220 9.0 14.5 33.4 
7.00 182 7.5 12.0 45.3 
8.00 246 10.1 16.2 61.5 
9.00 156 6.4 10.3 71.8 
10.00 162 6.6 10.7 82.4 
11.00 109 4.5 7.2 89.6 
12.00 83 3.4 5.5 95.1 
13.00 42 1.7 2.8 97.8 
14.00 24 1.0 1.6 99.4 
15.00 9 .4 .6 100.0 
Total 1520 62.3 100.0 
Missing System 919 37.7 
Total 2439 100.0 
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N Valid 924 1452 
Missing 1515 987 
Mean 9.5639 9.3643 
Range 7.00 8.00 
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1992 Cynicism - Index 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 5.00 4 .2 .4 .4 
6.00 26 1.1 2.8 3.2 
7.00 70 2.9 7.6 10.8 
8.00 98 4.0 10.6 21.4 
9.00 187 7.7 20.2 41.7 
10.00 245 10.0 26.5 68.2 
11.00 274 11.2 29.7 97.8 
12.00 20 .8 2.2 100.0 
Total 924 37.9 100.0 
Missing System 1515 62.1 
Total 2439 100.0 







5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 
1992 Cynicism 
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1996 Cynicism - Index 
Valid Cumulative 
FreQuency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 4.00 2 .1 .1 .1 
5.00 7 .3 .5 .6 
6.00 56 2.3 3.9 4.5 
7.00 113 4.6 7.8 12.3 
8.00 204 8.4 14.0 26.3 
9.00 305 12.5 21.0 47.3 
10.00 378 15.5 26.0 73.3 
11.00 374 15.3 25.8 99.1 
12.00 13 .5 .9 100.0 
Total 1452 59.5 100.0 
Missing System 987 40.5 
Total 2439 100.0 
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N Valid 709 1042 
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Mean .3046 .1884 
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N Valid 1005 1714 
Missing 1434 725 
Mean 1.54 1.55 
1992 GENDER 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 1. MALE 466 19.1 46.4 46.4 
2. FEMALE 539 22.1 53.6 100.0 
Total 1005 41.2 100.0 
Missing System 1434 58.8 
Total 2439 100.0 
1996GENDER 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 1. Male 768 31.5 44.8 44.8 
2. Female 946 38.8 55.2 100.0 
Total 1714 70.3 100.0 
Missing System 725 29.7 
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N Valid 999 1713 
Missing 1440 726 
Mean 2.2412 2.0403 
1992 Campaign Interest 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 1.00 175 7.2 17.5 17.5 
2.00 408 16.7 40.8 58.4 
3.00 416 17.1 41.6 100.0 
Total 999 41.0 100.0 
Missing System 1440 59.0 
Total 2439 100.0 
1996 Campaign Interest 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 1.00 398 16.3 23.2 23.2 
2.00 848 34.8 49.5 72.7 
3.00 467 19.1 27.3 100.0 
Total 1713 70.2 100.0 
Missing System 726 29.8 
Total 2439 100.0 
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N Valid 1000 1710 
Missing 1439 729 
Mean 2.4810 2.4105 
1992 Education 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 1.00 59 2.4 5.9 5.9 
2.00 401 16.4 40.1 46.0 
3.00 540 22.1 54.0 100.0 
Total 1000 41.0 100.0 
Missing System 1439 59.0 
Total 2439 100.0 
1996 Education 
Valid Cumulative 
Freauency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 1.00 230 9.4 13.5 13.5 
2.00 548 22.5 32.0 45.5 
3.00 932 38.2 54.5 100.0 
Total 1710 70.1 100.0 
Missing System 729 29.9 
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Valid 916 1564 
Missing 1523 875 
14.76 15.03 
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1992 Party 1996 Party 
ID ID 
N Valid 993 1694 
Missing 1446 745 
Mean 2.82 3.6777 
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1992 PARTY ID 
20---------------, 
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96 
APPENDIX B: ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS 
1992 
MEDIA 
1992 MEDIA Pearson Correlation 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
N 404 
1992 EVAL Pearson Correlation -.103* 
Sig. ( 1-tailed) .023 
N 374 
1992 Cynicism Pearson Correlation .030 
Sig. (1-tailed) .282 
N 373 
1992 Efficacy Pearson Correlation -.180* 11 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
N 399 
1996 MEDIA Pearson Correlation .684*11 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
N 296 
1996 EVAL Pearson Correlation -.009 
Sig. (1-tailed) .429 
N 364 
1996 Cynicism Pearson Correlation .080 
Sig. (1-tailed) .061 
N 378 
1996 Efficacy Pearson Correlation -.160* 11 
Sig. (1-tailed) .001 
N 400 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Correlations 
1992 1992 1992 
EVAL Cynicism Efficacy 
-.103* .030 -.180* .. 
.023 .282 .000 
374 373 399 
1.000 -.022 .008 
.318 .431 
492 456 488 
-.022 1.000 -.214* .. 
.318 .000 
456 500 496 
.008 -.214* .. 1.000 
.431 .000 
488 496 537 
-.086 .052 -.215*11 
.059 .175 .000 
332 331 353 
.242*"' .104* .071 
.000 .015 .062 
448 438 472 
.031 .421*'1 -.131*11 
.253 .000 .002 
466 478 506 
.049 -.171 .,, . 469*11 
.142 .000 .000 
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